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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Today, there is great interest among policy makers and the general public in improving
public transit in order to revitalize downtowns and reduce the harmful effects of driving
on the environment. Investments in public transit are costly, and individuals and elected
representatives will only vote in favor of such projects if they perceive the benefits of such
investments to exceed the costs. The political economy of popular support for public transit
investments hinges on the preferences of the median voter. Intuitively, if at least 50% of
the population supports a specific public transit investment, then it will be enacted when
voters engage in direct democracy, and it will be more likely to be adopted when elected
representatives determine transportation priorities.
In the United States and other countries, the median voter has been suburbanizing;
and few suburbanites rely on public transit systems. This study explores whether this
suburbanization decreases support for transit infrastructure and other pro-environment
policies.
We employ various data sets including individual-level surveys and precinct-level election
results covering 20 state-level ballot propositions that took place in California between
1990 and 2010. For decades, California has been a policy trendsetter as shown by its
ambitious environmental policy and efforts to encourage increased public transit ridership.
We use these data to test hypotheses concerning support for environmental and transit
policy and the role of:
• socio-economic variables, including income and unemployment status,
• household demographics, including age, education and race,
• ideology, and
• urban form attributes, including density, centrality and homeownership status.
The analysis of 20 propositions spanning two decades documents important characteristics
of elections and the electorate. Policy makers can use our results to predict how voters in
certain precincts are likely to vote on various types of transportation-related propositions.
In addition to statistical analysis of all 20 propositions, we also present three case studies
that provide context as well as use the data to test additional hypotheses. The first case
study is Proposition 1A from 2008, the California High-Speed Rail Bond Initiative. While
approved by 52.7% of voters, the high-speed rail project remains controversial. Indeed, a
proposition to “End the Bullet Train to Nowhere” was circulated for inclusion on the 2012
ballot, and although it did not qualify, it highlights that changes in public opinion threaten to
slow future progress on the high-speed rail and similar projects.1
The 2008 election took place in the midst of a serious recession. Our results document
that, all else being equal, a precinct in a jurisdiction with higher unemployment was only
somewhat more likely to vote for Prop. 1A. Should a future proposition involve either
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withdrawing or extending high-speed rail funding, our results can help develop informed
predictions. Among demographic variables, the likely impact of an aging, increasingly
educated population, and other questions, can also be gauged in terms of support using
our results.
Suburbanization appears to have reduced support for High-Speed Rail (HSR). HSR offers
the greatest benefits to urbanites that can more easily access it. Suburbanites live farther
from the new transit infrastructure and thus are less likely to use it. Our results document
the magnitude of this phenomenon. We refer to this as a “price” effect of suburbanization.
In addition to having easier access to HSR, theory predicts that urbanites will also tend
to see their land values rise from HSR investments. Our results are consistent with this
prediction; in Central Valley areas, homeowners near future HSR stations were more likely
to vote “yes” on Prop. 1A than homeowners far from future HSR stations. We refer to
this as an “investment” effect of suburbanization. Intuitively, suburbanites live farther from
public transit nodes and thus their homes are less likely to enjoy a windfall capitalization
effect caused by physical proximity and easy access to the new transit infrastructure. Our
findings are thus consistent with increasing suburbanization reducing support for transit
through both “price” and “investment” effects.
The second case study is Prop. 23 from 2010. This proposition only gathered 38.4% of the
vote and would have suspended California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (known as AB
32) if passed. Here again, suburbanization should affect voting on this proposition, as the
burden of the regulations that results from AB 32 are borne disproportionately by residents
with a large carbon footprint—and previous literature has found that suburbanites have
larger footprints. The results are also consistent with this “price” effect; even though the
benefits of climate change mitigation are a global public good, suburban voters were more
likely to support Prop. 23, all else being equal.
We also find support for the “investment” effect in the 2010 election, as homeownership
both increases and decreases the probability of voting to suspend AB 32, depending on
how far the precinct is from the center of the metropolitan area. Consistent with our theory,
homeownership leads to greater support for climate change mitigation in urban areas, but
homeownership leads to less support for these efforts in suburban areas.
We present a third detailed case study mainly for historical comparison; analysis of the
Passenger Rail And Clean Air Bond Act (Proposition 181 from 1994) indicates some but
not all of our findings regarding the effect of suburbanization on support for transit are
robust across multiple issues and time periods.
In sum, the three case studies generate new knowledge about voter preferences for
public investment in public transit and environmental regulation. Also, by documenting
the correlates of support for all transit-related propositions from 1990 to 2010, this study
serves as a valuable reference for policy makers, concerned citizens and others.
Finally, considering the central role of land value in our theoretical model, we end this report
with some thoughts on the possibility of using tax increment financing, value capture and
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other methods to finance public transit infrastructure. Creative financing mechanisms hold
the promise of increasing the amount of capital available for transit, and also of ensuring
that scarce transit investment funds are used for the highest-value projects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public transit investment represents a key strategy for revitalizing center cities and reducing
the harmful effects of driving on the environment. However, enacting transit projects
often requires approval of the median voter – that is, that at least 50% of the electorate
plus one, the median voter – vote to approve. However, in the United States and other
countries, the median voter has been suburbanizing, and few suburbanites rely on public
transit systems. This study explores the association between suburbanization and political
support for transit investment.
There are three broad explanations for why suburban voters may tend to oppose public transit
investment. First is an access hypothesis. Relative to center city residents, suburbanites
face a higher time cost of accessing such public transit and thus will be less likely to use it
and thus gain fewer benefits from its presence. Given that public transit tends to improve
access to the center city, suburbanites who also work in the suburbs will gain less from
such infrastructure, and our results document the magnitude of the phenomenon. We
refer to this as a “price” effect of suburbanization. A second explanation for why urbanites
are more likely to support transit investment is a capitalization hypothesis. Landowners in
center cities will enjoy a windfall in land values when new place-based investments are
made close to their homes. A third hypothesis for explaining differential center city versus
suburban support for transit projects relates to residential self-selection. If liberals tend
to live in center cities and to support public projects, while conservatives tend to live in
suburbs and to oppose high taxes and high cost projects, then we will observe a center
city/suburban differential even in the absence of the price and investment effects detailed
above. In the results we present below, we engage in several econometric strategies to
address this possibility.
Over the last two decades, a large number of important transportation-related ballot
measures have been voted on in California. A review of all ballot propositions from 1990 to
present revealed 20 had a significant transportation component. This study uses various
data sets to investigate the transit priorities that Californians revealed in individual-level
surveys and in binding voting initiatives. Leveraging both survey and voting data provides
the opportunity to test the validity of our estimate. If policy makers are basing decisions on
the results from surveys of public opinion, it is important to know how accurately the survey
responses predict actual voting.
Specifically, we test hypotheses concerning the role of household demographics,
including age, education and race, urban form attributes, including density, centrality and
homeownership status, ideology, and socio-economic variables, including income and
unemployment status.
The analysis of 20 propositions spanning two decades documents important characteristics
of elections and the electorate. Policy makers can use our results to predict how voters in
certain precincts are likely to vote on various types of transportation-related propositions.
This report begins by providing background information, including documenting
suburbanization trends in the United States and California, reviews related literature,
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discusses the ballot initiative process in California, and lays out the study’s methodological
approach.
Chapter II analyzes three case studies; two recent and one historical: the High-Speed Rail
proposition (Proposition 1A) from 2008, the Global Warming Solutions Act moratorium
proposition (Proposition 23) from 2010, and the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act
(Proposition 181) from 1994, an important example of a transportation funding attempt
from an earlier time period.
Suburbanization appears to have reduced support for High-Speed Rail (HSR). HSR
offers the greatest benefits to urbanites that can more easily access them. Our results
are consistent with this prediction; in Central Valley areas, homeowners near future HSR
stations were more likely to vote “yes” on Prop. 1A than homeowners far from future HSR
stations. We refer to this as an “investment” effect of suburbanization. Our findings are
thus consistent with increasing suburbanization reducing support for transit through both
“price” and “investment” effects.
The next case study is Prop. 23 from 2010. This proposition only gathered 38.4% of the
vote and would have suspended California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32).
Here again, suburbanization should affect voting on this proposition, as the burden of
the regulations that results from AB 32 are borne disproportionately by residents with a
large carbon footprint—and previous literature has found that suburbanites have larger
footprints.2 The results are consistent with this “price” effect; even though the benefits of
climate change mitigation are a global public good, suburban voters were more likely to
support Prop. 23, all else being equal.
We also find support for the “investment” effect, as homeownership may increase or
decrease the probability of support for transit environmental policies, depending on how
far the voting precinct is from downtown. Homeownership leads to greater support for
climate change mitigation in urban areas, but homeownership leads to less support for
these efforts in suburban areas. These results are perfectly consistent with predictions
from urban economic theory regarding how gas taxes and other policies that increase the
cost of transportation differentially affect urban versus suburban land markets.
We present a third detailed case study mainly for historical comparison; analysis of the
rail transit bond initiative – Proposition 181 from 1994 – indicates that some but not all of
our findings are robust across multiple issues and time periods. While we find evidence of
the price effects of suburbanization that we describe above, results concerning investment
effects were inconsistent with results from the more recent time periods. In California, the
early 1990s was an interesting time from a transit funding perspective, and as we discuss
in the conclusion, should be studied in more detail in future work.
In sum, the three case studies generate new knowledge about voter preferences for
public investment in public transit and environmental regulation. Also, by documenting the
correlates of support for all transit-related propositions from 1990 to 2010, this study will
serve as a valuable reference for future research.
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Finally, considering the central role of land value in our theoretical model, we end this
report with some thoughts on the possible role of tax increment financing, value capture
and other ways of leveraging land markets to finance public transit infrastructure. Creative
financing mechanisms hold the promise of increasing the amount of capital available for
transit, and also of ensuring that scarce transit investment funds are used for the highestvalue projects.
The remainder of this Introduction contains five subsections that: document suburbanization
trends in the United States and California, review related literature, discusses the ballot
initiative process in California, lay out the study’s central hypotheses, and explain the study’s
methodological approach. This is followed by the three case studies. Then, we present
statistical results for all 20 propositions from 1990-2010. The Conclusion summarizes
the findings, highlights limitations of this study, and discusses the possibility of creatively
leveraging land markets to generate investment funds for public transit investment.

SUBURBANIZATION TRENDS
In each decade from 1970 to 2010, for the entire United States, we calculate the share
of metropolitan area residents who live a fixed interval distance from the central business
district (CBD) (e.g., 0-5 miles, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, etc.). We use tract-level data from the
Neighborhood Change database for the 1970-2000 period, and tract-level data from the
U.S. Census Gazetteer for 2010.3

Figure 1. Suburbanization Trends in the U.S., 1970-2010. Percent of U.S.
Population Living Less than Five Miles From Downtown
Source: Neighborhood Change Database and 2010 U.S. Census Gazetteer.
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Figure 2. Suburbanization Trends in the U.S., 1970-2010. Percent of U.S.
Population Living Between 30-35 Miles From Downtown
Source: Neighborhood Change Database and 2010 U.S. Census Gazetteer.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show that more and more metro residents are living far from the city
center. These two figures highlight what we feel are the most dramatic suburbanization
trends in our data. The complete set of calculations from which the figures above were
derived is presented in Table 1. In 1970, 31.6% of the metropolitan population lived within
five miles of a CBD, while by the year 2010 this percentage had shrunk to 16.9%. In
contrast, in 1970, 18% of the metropolitan population lived more than 20 miles from the
CBD. By 2010, this percentage had grown to 39%.

Table 1.

Percent of U.S. Population Living at Various Distances (Miles) From
CBD, 1970-2010
Miles from CBD

Year

0-5

5-10

10-15

15-20

20-25

25-30

30-35

1970

31.6

25.6

15.3

9.5

6.3

4.3

2.4

>35
5.0

1980

26.7

23.9

15.7

10.3

7.2

5.1

2.9

8.3

1990

20.3

19.3

13.7

9.2

6.6

4.7

2.9

23.3

2000

18.7

19.2

14.2

9.8

7.0

5.0

3.1

23.0

2010

16.9

18.8

14.6

10.2

7.3

5.2

3.4

23.5

Source: Neighborhood Change Database and 2010 U.S. Census Gazetteer.

We have also repeated the calculations shown above for California’s metropolitan areas.
There are no major differences to report. California is more urban than the average U.S.
state, which means the bars in Figure 1 are all higher, however both graphs show similar
suburbanization trends.
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Next, using the California year 2000 party registration data from the Statewide Database
at University of California at Berkeley, we present the share of residents in each of the
intervals reported in the two figures above who are Democrats and Republicans.

Figure 3. Political Party Membership and Distance From Downtown,
California Data
Source: SWDB data and authors calculations.

Figure 3 highlights that the conventional wisdom about where Democrats and Republicans
live in cities is correct. More than 50% of residents who live within five miles of a city center
are Democrats. This share shrinks monotonically with distance from the city center. In
contrast, roughly 25% of residents who live within five of a city center are Republicans and
this share rises monotonically with distance from the city center. Note the percentages of
Democrats and Republicans do not sum to 100% in the figure as there are a number of
independent voters and those who register within one of several minor parties.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Our study relates to the literature that studies ballot initiatives to infer public good demand.4
Several of these studies employ election data from California to study environmental issues.
Matthew Kahn and John Matsusaka based their estimates on county-level election return
data, while Kahn’s follow-up studies were an improvement in that they utilized election
return data at the census tract level. However, none of these studies utilized data from
elections occurring after 2000, and few of the propositions considered were transit issues.
Xiaoyu Wu and Bowman Cutter5 followed up on these studies and also analyzed
environmental and a few transit initiatives from California. By employing block-group level
data, their analysis employs even more refined geographical data than Kahn. In addition,
they included estimate models using spatial econometric techniques, which have desirable
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statistical properties when data suffer from certain problems such as omitted variables. In
one way, our methodology is identical to theirs, as we followed their method of encoding
the control variables (discussed below under methodology). We also employ the most
geographically refined, block-group-level data. However, our approach differs in that we
focus on transit over environmental initiatives.
We also go one step further than all of the above-mentioned studies, by analyzing the
most refined geographical unit possible – namely individual-level survey data. For one
proposition, Prop. 23 from 2010, we are able to estimate individual-level and precinct-level
regressions, using the same sets of variables. Erzo Luttmer6 also analyzed both voting
and survey data, and our approach is complementary to his.
Although tangential, we draw some insight from the cost-benefit analysis literature that
has attempted to quantify the bias associated with contingent valuation methods (i.e.,
stated preference survey methods). Some studies found evidence of a bias; Vossler and
co-authors7 and Schläpfer and co-authors8 found that survey methods tend to overstate
consumer valuations. However, Schläpfer and Hanley,9 and Robert Johnston10 did not find
evidence of a bias. One study11 used Field Poll data (which we also employ) and California
ballot initiative data in an attempt to verify survey findings, with substantial success.
However, all of these cost-benefit studies attempt to measure environmental goods, and
we are not aware of studies that have explored transportation goods.
Transportation scholars have analyzed ballot initiatives before. Work on local transportation
initiatives includes Werbel and Haas,12 Haas and co-authors,13 Hannay and Wachs,14 and
Haas.15 Our focus differs from these papers in that we focus on state-level ballot initiatives.
Also, although some of these studies contain statistical analysis, our approach relies on a
much more quantitative methodology.
We conclude this discussion of related literature by mentioning a few other studies we
consulted and found helpful in preparation of this report. Gerber and co-authors16 studied
state-level ballot initiatives in California, including one of the same propositions we analyze
(Prop. 116 from 1990). They did not explore the determinants of support for initiatives and
their focus was rather different from ours.
Recently, several studies of the effect of gas prices on the housing prices have been
published, and as discussed below in the Hypotheses subsection, our study relates to
these.17 Whittaker and co-authors18 analyzed the determinants of holding environmentalist
beliefs, using Field Poll data, over several decades. A major focus in their study was
on Latino preferences over time. They found that more Latinos, over time, identify as
environmentalist. We examine the role of ideology at various points throughout this report,
and this relates closely to the literature that is well summarized in their study.
Finally, three studies we read deal with somewhat similar issues to those that concern us
here, and also analyze similar data. Wassmer and Lascher19 analyzed survey data from
the Field Poll. The study by Lewis and Baldassare20 analyzes survey data from the Public
Policy Institute of California (PPIC), which is another source of survey data for the present
study. Deacon and Schläpfer studied how spatial variation in public good levels affects
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voting in a local ballot proposition; in this regard their study is quite similar to our general
approach.21

BALLOT MEASURES AND THE BALLOT INITIATIVE PROCESS
Between 1990 and 2010, California’s voters voted on at least 20 ballot propositions related
to transit provision. In Table 2, we list these propositions, the month and year of the election,
and the percent voting yes. The names of propositions that passed are italicized.
Nine out of 20 propositions passed. This is a higher rate of passage than reported by
Gerber and co-authors for all ballot propositions.22
Two broad types of propositions can be identified. The first is termed a Transportation
Funding Protection proposition; six of this type are in our sample.23 These generally aim
to prevent the legislature from using gas tax and other sources of revenue (e.g., motor
vehicle sales tax) for non-transportation expenses. These are popular, as voters approved
four of the six.24

Table 2.

List of Ballot Propositions Studied
Name/Description

% Yes
Vote

Year

Month

Prop.

2010

Nov

23

Suspends AB 32 until unemployment is below 5.5% for one year

38.4

2010

Nov

22

Transportation Funding Protection

60.7

2008

Nov

1A

California High Speed Rail Bond. Senate Bill 1856

52.7

2008

Nov

10

Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy

40.5

2008

Feb

91

Transportation Funding Protection

41.6

2006

Nov

1A

Transportation Funding Protection

77.0

2006

Nov

1B

Air Quality, and Port Security Bond Act

61.4

2006

Nov

87

Alternative Energy. Tax on California oil producers

45.4

2002

Nov

51

Transportation Protection of Motor Vehicle Sales Tax

42.2

2002

Mar

42

Transportation Congestion Improvement Act

69.1

1998

Nov

2

Transportation Funding Protection

75.4

1998

Nov

7

Air Quality Improvement

43.6

1994

Nov

181

Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994

34.9

1994

Nov

185

Public Transportation Trust Funds. Gasoline Sales Tax

19.5

1992

Nov

156

Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992

48.1

1992

Nov

157

Toll Roads and Highways

28.2

1990

Nov

125

Motor Vehicle Tax. Rail Transit Funding

45.6

1990

Jun

108

Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990

56.3

1990

Jun

111

Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990

52.4

1990

Jun

116

Rail Transportation. Bond Act

53.3

The second broad type of proposition relates to funding for transportation infrastructure.
Table 2 contains examples of gas tax proposals (on both consumers and producers) and
bond measures. Although the conventional wisdom is that voters strongly oppose gas
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taxes, a review of the record suggests this is not an iron law.25 For example Prop. 111,
from 1990, imposed gas taxes and truck weight fees, and was approved by 52.4%. True,
Prop. 125 from 1992 and Prop. 185 from 1994 failed, both of which had similar elements
to Prop. 111. And Prop. 87 from 2006 also failed, which would have imposed taxes on oil
producers rather than consumers. However, the success rate for gas tax propositions is
closer to 25%, rather than 0% that seems to be the conventional wisdom. With regard to
the other method of financing transit infrastructure, namely bond acts, again we see some
that pass and some that fail, with about half of bond acts passing.
Finally, there are a few propositions that do not fit neatly into either of these two categories.
These include Prop. 157 from 1992, Prop. 7 from 1998, Prop. 10 from 2008, and Prop. 23
from 2010. We will delay discussing the diversity of initiatives further until Chapter III of this
report. Readers seeking more details about these propositions can turn to the California
Secretary of State’s Voter Information publications that we reference in Appendix A.
With regard to the institutional details of how propositions appear on ballots, the California
Secretary of State’s website describes the following five ways a voter in California may
come to vote on a proposition:26
Legislative Bond Measure
Any bill that calls for the issuance of general obligation bonds must be adopted in each
house of the Legislature by a two-thirds vote, signed by the Governor, and approved
by a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted. Whenever a bond measure is
on a statewide ballot, an overview of California’s bond debt is included in the ballot
pamphlet.
Legislative Constitutional Amendment
Whenever the Legislature proposes an amendment to the California Constitution, it is
known as a legislative constitutional amendment. It must be adopted in the Senate and
the Assembly by a two-thirds vote before it can be placed on the ballot. A legislative
constitutional amendment does not require the Governor’s signature. This type of
amendment requires a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted.
Legislative Initiative Amendment
Whenever the Legislature proposes to amend a law that was previously enacted
through the initiative process, the Legislature is required to present the amendment to
the voters for passage. The Legislature may amend the previously-adopted initiative
measure if the measure permits legislative amendment or repeal without voter approval.
This type of amendment requires a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted.
Initiatives
Often referred to as “direct democracy,” the initiative process is the power of the
people to place measures on the ballot. These measures can either create or change
statutes (including general obligation bonds) and amend the California Constitution.
If the initiative proposes to amend California statute, signatures of registered voters
gathered must equal in number to 5% of the votes cast for all candidates for Governor
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in the previous gubernatorial election. If the initiative proposes to amend the California
Constitution, signatures of registered voters gathered must equal in number to 8% of
the votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the previous gubernatorial election. An
initiative requires a simple majority of the public’s vote to be enacted.
Referendum
Referendum is the power of the people to approve or reject statutes adopted by the
Legislature. However, referenda cannot be used to approve or reject urgency measures
or statutes that call for elections or provide for tax levies or appropriations for current
expenses of the state. Voters wishing to block implementation of a legislativelyadopted statute must gather signatures of registered voters equal in number to 5% of
the votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the previous gubernatorial election
within 90 days of enactment of the bill. Once on the ballot, the law is defeated if voters
cast more NO votes than YES votes on the referendum question.
As mentioned above, for each of the propositions we list in Table 2, we also reproduce detailed
information from the relevant election’s Voter Information Pamphlet (see Appendix C). Further
information on propositions can be found on the Web. In addition to these, though covering
only 2000 to the current period, we also found the Institute of Governmental Studies at the
University of California, Berkeley to be a useful resource to describe ballot measures.27

HYPOTHESES
This report’s empirical work sheds light on many aspects of voter support for transit.
However, we are most interested in testing the following three hypotheses. We first list
these hypotheses and then discuss some key points.
• Hypothesis 1: Suburbanization, as measured by distance to the CBD, is associated
with less voter support for transit infrastructure and green transportation policy.
• Hypothesis 2: Urban homeownership is positively associated with voter support for
transit infrastructure and green transportation policy.
• Hypothesis 3: Suburban homeownership is negatively associated with voter support
for transit infrastructure and green transportation policy.
One can think of Hypothesis 1 as a “price” hypothesis, and Hypotheses 2 and 3 as
“investment” hypotheses. The logic behind Hypothesis 1, the price hypothesis, is
straightforward. Transit infrastructure offers the greatest benefits to urbanites that can
more easily access them. Suburbanites live farther from the new transit infrastructure
and thus are less likely to use them. Suburbanites who also work in the suburbs are
highly unlikely to commute using public transit, as public transit (and HSR) is usually a
transportation technology that is focused on taking people to downtown locations. The
basis for Hypothesis 1 is that suburbanites face a higher time price for accessing public
transit and many of these suburbanites may also not value a transport technology that
takes them downtown because they shop and work in the suburbs.28
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Other policies have benefits that do not vary spatially but that have costs that do vary
spatially. Hypothesis 1 applies in these cases as well. Consider Proposition 23 that was
defeated in 2010. Climate change mitigation is a global public good, and the benefits of
this policy do not obviously vary systematically across cities and suburbs. However, the
costs of the policy do. Households that produce more carbon emissions, either directly
or indirectly, will face a higher cost of living in general as policies related to AB 32, such
as carbon pricing, go into effect.29 In previous work, we document that households living
farther from the city center and live at lower population density, drive more and consume
more gasoline. Such households are aware that carbon pricing would raise the cost of
gasoline.
On a related note, although this report studies direct democracy, the same incentives
we describe here also affect representative democracy. The political representatives of
suburban districts tend to oppose carbon mitigation regulation. Work by Cragg and coauthors30 document that controlling for a Congressional District’s per-capita income and
the political ideology of the Representative; high per-capita carbon dioxide emissions
districts feature Congressmen who vote against carbon mitigation legislation (such as the
2009 Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) Act). Thus, spatial
variation, either in project benefits or policy costs, is key to the causal mechanisms behind
the “price” hypothesis, which we test using data from California ballot propositions.
Hypothesis 2, the first of the two “investment” hypotheses, relates to William Fischel’s
landmark 2001 study The Homevoter Hypothesis,31 which describes the powerful
incentives faced by homeowners to vote, and more generally behave, in ways consistent
with maximizing the value of their homes. For basically the same reasons outlined above
for Hypothesis 1 (spatial variation in project benefits or policy costs), property values will
generally rise in urban neighborhoods as a result of the policies we study.32 For policies
like AB 32 that increase the cost of driving, the standard “monocentric city” model from
urban economics shows that higher transportation costs will increase the value of land
near the center.33
This urban economics model also predicts that higher transportation costs will decrease
land values farther from the edge of the city, as households become more willing to trade off
higher rents for shorter commutes. Thus the same set of forces that are behind Hypothesis
2 are also behind Hypothesis 3. Again, assuming homeowners behave (and vote) in ways
consistent with maximizing the value of their homes, we predict that homeownership will
cause suburban voters to be less likely to support carbon pricing. For transit infrastructure
projects like HSR, it is possible that policy benefits could be so large that all property
values will rise, even in the suburbs. However, we predict that suburban homeowners will
perceive that general fund expenditures will need to be curtailed for projects that would
increase their housing value by more than HSR, or, that their taxes will need to rise to pay
for the project, and either of these would lead to a fall in their property value. In turn, this
will cause them to be less likely to support HSR.
If these hypotheses are true, then given suburbanization patterns in the United States, it
will become increasingly more difficult – even in liberal states such as California – to gain
voter support for public transit infrastructure and low carbon policies.
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We next describe the methodology that we employ. We explore the demographic,
economic, ideological and urban form correlates of voting for transit-related propositions.
The propositions we analyze are listed in Table 2 above.
We obtained our data from a variety of sources. The Statewide Database (SWDB) at UC
Berkeley distributes statement of vote files matched to census blocks for elections between
1992 and present. Over this time period, we were able to find data for all propositions but
one (Prop. 42). However, we were able to obtain survey data covering Prop. 42, from
the Field Poll (produced by the Field Corporation). Thus, we have data on all 16 transitfocused propositions from 1992 to present.
Regarding the four propositions from 1990, unfortunately SWDB data do not go back
this far. However, we do have survey data for three of these propositions, again collected
by the Field Poll. Thus we are able to present estimate models for all but one of the 20
transit initiatives that took place between 1990 and 2000, by using voting data for 15, and
by using survey data for four. For one proposition, Prop. 23 from 2010, we analyze both
survey and voting data. This survey data was collected by the Public Policy Institute of
California (PPIC).
For our analysis of voting data, we merge additional variables to the data supplied by
SWDB, namely the 1990 Census block group summary file, the 2000 Census block group
summary file, and the 2006-2010 American Community Survey (ACS) five-year estimates
(which replaced the decennial census as the primary source for important variables,
including income and education), again at the block-group level. We match 1992 and 1994
voting data to the 1990 Census, 1998 and 2002 voting data to the 2000 Census, and 2006,
2008 and 2010 voting data to the ACS.
Our survey data, on the other hand, already includes a rich set of demographic and other
variables. The only additional data we merge with the survey data is the population density
(population per square mile) of the respondent’s zip code and distance to downtown.
An important characteristic of our data is its high level of geographical refinement. For most
of the survey data, we know the respondent’s zip code, and thus have geo-coordinates
for zip code centroids (technically, these are zip code tabulation areas, or ZCTAs, and this
data is supplied by the Census Gazetteer). Regarding voting data, we know all block group
centroids. As we will show, having geographically refined measures is an important part of
our analysis.
We study the political divide on transit and related areas like carbon policy using evidence
from precinct voting and public opinion polls. Possible factors explaining this division
include: socio-economic (income, unemployment), demographic (age, ethnicity, education),
political ideology (Republican, Democrat) and residential locational choice.
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To study the contrast between center city voters and suburban voters over public transit
voting and carbon pricing, we estimate several versions of equation (1) below:
Percent Yesij = β0j + xiβ1j + β2jyi + ziβ3j + εij						(1)
where Percent Yesij refers to the percent of precinct i voting yes on a proposition j. β0j is the
intercept, or constant, term. Three types of explanatory variables are identified as variable
types x, y and z: xi is a matrix and represents socioeconomic and demographic variables
in precinct i and β1j is the coefficient vector on these terms; is a scalar and represents an
ideological variable in precinct i and β3j is the coefficient on this variable; and zi is a matrix
of urban form variables in precinct i and β3 is the coefficient vector on these terms. Finally,
εij is an error term with the usual properties. We will estimate equation (1) using ordinary
least squares (OLS), controlling for county fixed effects, while weighting the observations
by the total number of votes in precinct i to mitigate heteroskedasticity concerns.34 We
estimate equation (1) for each of the 15 propositions for which we have voting data. As
mentioned above, we were unable to find voting data for 1990 propositions, and any data
for Prop. 125 from 1990.35
For the three propositions we use in our case studies (Prop. 1A from 2008, Prop. 23
from 2010 and Prop. 181 from 1994), our approach is to estimate both restricted and
unrestricted versions of equation (1). In particular, we present our estimates for each data
set by first restricting β2 and β3 to be zero in order to explore the effect of socioeconomic
and demographic variables in isolation. We then restrict β1 and β3 to be zero to look at the
effect of ideology in isolation. Next, we restrict β1 and β2 to be zero to look at the effect of
urban form in isolation. Finally, we estimate a model where only β2 is restricted to be zero
(to explore the effect of urban form controlling for demographics), and then a model where
no coefficient vectors are restricted. Thus, for three of the propositions, we estimate five
versions of equation (1), which differ only in terms of restrictions. This approach enables
us to develop a deeper understanding of the relative explanatory power of the variables.
Finally, we present side-by-side estimates of the unrestricted version of (1) for all 15
propositions from 1990-2010 for which we have voting data. Comparing coefficient
estimates across propositions allows us to check whether unmeasured proposition-specific
variables or other characteristics of the propositions, including financing mechanisms (e.g.,
bond measure, tax increase, etc.), election type (primary versus general), etc., are driving
any results.
In the cases where we analyze survey data, the model we estimate is very similar to that
shown in equation (1), but the variables are instead the individual-level counterparts. For
example, rather than fraction of the precinct with a college degree, we use an indicator of
whether or not the respondent has a college degree. Also, rather than representing the
percent of votes in a precinct, the dependent variable is dichotomous, representing either
preference for or against a proposition. We estimate these models using survey data and
OLS regression. We have verified the robustness of these linear probability models using
other estimation strategies including probit and logit. The survey data are weighted using
the analytical weights provided by the various distributors of the survey data.
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To be precise, when using survey data we estimate the following model:
Vote Yesij = β0j + xiβ1j + β2jyi + ziβ3j + εij						(2)
Where Vote Yesij is a zero or one variable indicating whether or not the respondent i supports
proposition j. Comparing equations (1) and (2), one can see that we use the same notation
for the right-hand side variables. However, these variables, while measuring the same
types of factors, are for the most part not identical to those used with equation (1) for the
precinct-level data. For example, rather than use the average income in precinct i, we
use the income reported by respondent i, and so on. The only variables that are identical
between (1) and (2) are population density of and distance to downtown from respondent
i’s zip code.
Our basic approach to testing for an ecological inference problem is straightforward; we
simply compare the results obtained with both types of data. If the results are similar, then
we can be more confident that the aggregate voting data is not leading us to make invalid
inferences.

One potential weakness of the approach outlined above is that we do not explicitly model
how heterogeneous households choose where to live within a metropolitan area. Further,
we recognize that households are not randomly assigned to live in the center city or the
suburbs. For instance, some people seeking excitement and variety may choose to live
at a central location while households with school-age children may seek out suburban
locations. In terms of estimating equation (1) using OLS, we are implicitly assuming
that controlling for the explanatory variables embodied in the x, y, and z vectors that the
unobserved determinants of choosing a residential location are uncorrelated with the
unobserved determinants of voting on the transit measures.
As discussed in the hypothesis section, we seek to test the “treatment effect”: that distance
from public transit infrastructure reduces demand for such infrastructure. However, we
recognize that there is also a potential “selection effect”: that those who would never use
such a transit option choose to live far from it. In short, people who live in the suburbs may
vote against transit not because they receive disproportionate net benefits, but because
they simply dislike transit, and that is one reason they moved to the suburbs in the first
place.
Our main attempt to address this concern is to include a proxy for the neighborhood’s
average political ideology, or, with the survey data, a measure of the respondent’s ideology.
It is plausible that the political ideology is related to preferences for transit, with liberal
areas or respondents being more likely to be pro-transit and conservative areas being
more likely to be anti-transit.36
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II. CALIFORNIA BALLOT INITIATIVES CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, we study three ballot proposition case studies – Prop. 181 from 1994,
Prop. 1A from 2008, and Prop. 23 from 2010. We include more background information for
these propositions here and later in the report. To study these propositions more deeply,
we estimate restricted versions of equation (1), and also explore interactions between
variables. Once the reader is familiar with the models we estimate for Propositions 185,
23 and 1A, it will be easier to interpret our results for all propositions that we present in the
final section before the conclusion.
We lead with a discussion of the 2008 election, in which California voters approved Prop.
1A, a $9.95 billion high-speed rail (HSR) bond. After examining this proposition in detail,
we next turn to study Prop. 23 from 2010, in which voters rejected a proposal to suspend
the State’s climate change mitigation efforts. The final case study we present is Prop. 181
from 1994. This was the third of three major bond initiatives from the early 1990s that
would have provided additional funding for rail transit infrastructure.
Figure 4 displays three maps showing voting results for the three case study propositions,
at the county level. We see that in all three elections, San Francisco is the most liberal
county. Also, the coastal counties are more liberal than those of the Central Valley. Finally,
northern California is more liberal along the coast, but the reverse is true for the Central
Valley (i.e., northern counties in the Central Valley are more conservative than southern
counties in the Central Valley).
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Figure 4. Support for Case Study Propositions, By County
Source: SWDB, University of California, Berkeley.

Clockwise from top left, the maps above show Support for Prop. 181 from 1994, Prop.
1A from 2008, and Prop. 23 from 2010. In the top two maps, darker shades represent
pro-transit preferences. In the bottom map, lighter shades represent pro-environmental
preferences, as a vote yes on Prop. 23 is a vote to suspend environmental regulation.

PROP. 1A: CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED RAIL BOND (2008)
Looking through the language of the propositions we analyze, we find that HSR in
California has a long history. Of the propositions in our study pool, we first find mention of
HSR in 1994, where Proposition 185, a voter-initiated initiative, contained two provisions
for “fast” inter-city rail projects. The first provision of Prop. 185 would have established a
San Francisco Bay Area-Los Angeles Rail Corridor Joint Powers Agency. From the 1994
General Election Voter Information pamphlet:37
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The counties of Los Angeles, Monterey, San Benito, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara,
Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, and Ventura shall form the San Francisco Bay Area-Los
Angeles Rail Corridor Joint Powers Agency for the purposes of acquiring, constructing,
and operating a fast train intercity, tourist, commuter, and urban rail corridor between
the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles…It shall be the goal of the joint powers
agency to establish fast train intercity passenger rail service capable of transporting
passengers between the San Francisco Bay area and Los Angeles in less than six
hours.
Another provision of Prop. 185 also touched on a different high-speed rail route,38 namely
in the San Joaquin Valley:
It shall be the goal of the state to provide high-speed train service, if sufficient funds
become available, between Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area via the San
Joaquin Valley by the year 2010. The committee shall determine whether to allocate
funds pursuant to this paragraph…the timing of the allocation of the funds shall be at
the discretion of the committee.
Although the HSR proposition did not pass in the 1994 election (we discuss this election
further in our third case study), the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CaHSRA) existing
today was established in 1996 through Senate Bill 1420 (SB 1420). From the Legislative
Counsel’s Digest:39
Existing law provides for the funding and regulation of rail transportation. An existing
Intercity High-Speed Rail Commission was created in 1993 to conduct studies and to
prepare a high-speed rail plan for the state.
This bill would create the High-Speed Rail Authority in state government. The bill
would prescribe the membership of the authority, and provide for the compensation
of members. The bill would require the authority to direct the development and
implementation of intercity high-speed rail service that is fully coordinated with other
public transportation services.
Since its establishment, the CaHSRA has gone through several business plans; the most
recent was published in 2012.40
In 2008, voters approved Prop. 1A. The voter information pamphlet for that election
describes the purpose of Prop. 1A (entitled the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger
Train Bond Act) as:41
To provide Californians a safe, convenient, affordable, and reliable alternative to driving
and high gas prices; to provide good-paying jobs and improve California’s economy
while reducing air pollution, global warming greenhouse gases, and our dependence
on foreign oil, shall $9.95 billion in bonds be issued to establish a clean, efficient highspeed train service linking Southern California, the Sacramento/San Joaquin Valley,
and the San Francisco Bay Area, with at least 90% of bond funds spent for specific
projects, with private and public matching funds required, including, but not limited to,
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federal funds, funds from revenue bonds, and local funds, and all bond funds subject
to independent audits? Fiscal Impact: State costs of $19.4 billion, assuming 30 years
to pay both principal and interest costs of the bonds. Payments would average about
$647 million per year. When constructed, unknown operation and maintenance costs,
probably over $1 billion annually; at least partially, and potentially fully, offset by
passenger fares.

A majority (52.7%) voted yes, meaning that nearly $10 billion in bonds were approved for
sale to finance development of the HSR project connecting the main population centers
of the state.

Figure 5. California High-Speed Rail (HSR) Map
Source: Modified version of image from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cahsr_map.svg (accessed February 20, 2013).

Figure 5 shows the proposed HSR route. This highlights that this place-based, multi-billion
dollar investment will have differential effects across California. Previous research has
examined how Europe’s high-speed rail has impacted economic activity.42
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Commonly asked questions about HSR in California include: How long will the journey
take?; How many stations will there be?; and Which sections will be built first? Review
of the 2008 Voter Information pamphlet provides the following answers: supporters claim
top speeds of 220 mph, and travel time “from Los Angeles to San Francisco in about 2½
hours for about $50 per person.” This document also explains that, “Phase I of the train
project is the corridor between San Francisco Transbay Terminal and Los Angeles Union
Station…”43 Thus, an informed voter would know that although the proposition mentions
HSR connections to Sacramento and San Diego, construction would not begin on these
sections for some time.44

Voting Data
Table 3 below contains descriptions for variables used in this and the next case study. The
methodology section of this report (above) describes our approach to estimating equation (1).
Recall that the dependent variable is the percent of the block group voting for the proposition, and
this voting data comes from the SWDB. Data for the remaining variables, with two exceptions,
are from the 2006-2010 ACS five-year estimates, and these data were downloaded from
Social Explorer. We provide full details on all data sources in the paragraphs below and in
Appendix A: Data.

Table 3.

Description of Variables Used in Analysis of Census and Voting Data

Variable Name

Description

PCT08_1A_Y

Percent of block group voting for Prop. 1A (2008)

INC_L_20

Percent of block group with average annual income less than $20,000

INC_20_40

Percent of block group with average annual income between $20,001 and $40,000

INC_40_60

Percent of block group with average annual income between $40,001 and $60,000

INC_75_100

Percent of block group with average annual income between $75,001 and $100,000

INC_100_P

Percent of block group with average annual income greater than $100,001

COLLEGE

Percent of block group with college degree or higher

BLACK

Percent of block group black

ASIAN

Percent of block group asian

OTHER

Percent of block group in “other” race category

HISPANIC

Percent of block group hispanic

YOUNG

Percent of adult population between 18 and 34 years of age

OLD

Percent of adult population above 65 years of age

UNEMPLOY

Percent of block group unemployed

BUSH

Percent of block group voting for George W. Bush in 2004

HOMEOWN

Percent of block group that are homeowners

lnDISTANCE

Natural log of distance to center of MSA, measured in kilometers

lnDENSITY

Natural log of population density of block group, measured as persons per square mile

Notes: MSA: Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Min e ta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

24

California Ballot Initiatives Case Studies

Socio-Economic Variables
For this analysis, our socioeconomic variables include income variables and unemployment
data. Rather than including a single summary measure of a block group-level income,
such as average or median income, we follow Wu and Cutter and include five variables,
measuring the percentage of voters in each group. Considering that Prop. 1A funds rail
transit, and higher income groups can more easily afford other transportation options, we
expect income to be negatively correlated with support for Prop. 1A. We also gathered a
measure of unemployment from census data.45 As supporters of Prop. 1A highlighted, the
jobs the project would create, we expect unemployment to be positively correlated with
support for Prop. 1A.

Demographic Variables
The demographic variables include measures of educational attainment, race and ethnicity,
and age. Holding income constant, we expect education to be positively correlated with
support for Prop. 1A. We have less of a solid basis for hypothesizing the relationship
between the race and ethnicity variables. Finally, all else equal, older voters may depend
on transit more than younger voters. Of course, it is possible that older voters are more
fiscally conservative and thus may reject state bond initiatives in general, but keep in mind
that equation (1) controls for ideology and other variables.

Ideological Variables
To model ideology, we include a measure of the percentage of the block group voting for
the Republican presidential candidate in the previous election (George W. Bush). The
2008 election was a presidential election, but we use the percentage of the block group
voting for George W. Bush in the 2004 election as the control for ideology. Note that this
ideological variable was predetermined when the 2008 election took place; that is, other
than the dependent variable, we do not use any other variable from the 2008 election in
the model. We follow this practice whenever possible throughout this report. We feel it is
important to use only predetermined independent variables as this enables the results of
our models to be useful for predicting election results before elections occur.

Urban Form Variables
The final set of variables includes three measures of urban form: distance, density and
homeownership. These are our main variables of interest. We expect the distance a voter
lives from downtown, a measure of suburbanization, to be negatively correlated with
support for Prop. 1A. Rail transit stations tend to be located near downtowns, and so the
“price” of using transit (in terms of access) is lower for downtown residents. Similarly, rail
transit access is often easier in denser neighborhoods, and for this reason we expect
population density to be positively correlated with support for transit. Finally, we include
homeownership, as suburban areas tend to have high rates of homeownership.
Specifically, the variable lnDISTANCE was created by merging geocodes into the ACS
block group data, and then using the 2006 definitions of metropolitan areas, we calculate
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the distance from each block group to the center of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
in which the block group is located. For block groups that are not in an MSA, we set
their distance equal to 50 miles (80 kilometers, as programmed in the model), which is
the distance we have arbitrarily chosen as the urban fringe.46 In all models that use this
variable, we calculate this as ln(1+distance) (that is, the natural log of one plus the distance
in kilometers). Similarly, the lnDENSITY (population density) variable is calculated as
ln(1+density) (that is, natural log of one plus population density at the block group level),
measured as population by land area, measured in square miles.
We show summary statistics for these data in Table 4. Note that most of the variables have
a range between zero and one (the exceptions are lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY). For
example, the variable INC_L_20 has a mean of 0.15, and this means that in the average
block group, 15% of the population has income of less than $20,000.
Note the mean of PCT_23_Y and PCT08_1A_Y do not necessarily equal the mean of the
actual vote, because here the unit of observation is the census block group.

Table 4.

Summary Statistics for Census and Voting Variables, 2006-2010

Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

PCT_23_Y

23,126

0.37

0.12

Min.
0

Max.
1

PCT08_1A_Y

23,134

0.54

0.12

0

1

INC_L_20

23,082

0.15

0.13

0

1

INC_20_40

23,082

0.19

0.12

0

1

INC_40_60

23,082

0.16

0.09

0

1

INC_75_100

23,082

0.13

0.08

0

1

INC_100_P

23,082

0.27

0.20

0

1

COLLEGE

23,118

0.30

0.21

0

1

BLACK

23,123

0.06

0.12

0

1

ASIAN

23,123

0.12

0.16

0

1

OTHER

23,123

0.19

0.16

0

1

HISPANIC

23,123

0.34

0.28

0

1

YOUNG

23,123

0.32

0.14

0

1

OLD

23,123

0.16

0.11

0

1

UNEMPLOY

23,093

0.09

0.07

0

1

BUSH

23,110

0.41

0.19

0

1

HOMEOWN

23,082

0.59

0.28

0

1

lnDISTANCE

23,211

3.00

0.88

0.02

4.39

lnDENSITY

23,189

8.38

1.70

0.00

12.33

Table 5 contains the results of estimating a restricted version of equation (1). Here, the
coefficients on the urban form and ideology variables are restricted to be zero, so that we
can focus on the effect of socio-economic and demographic variables. Note that in this
model, as in all of the models we analyze in this report that utilize voting data, we include
county fixed effects and the variables are weighted by the total number of votes in the
census block group.
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Table 5.

OLS Regression; Prop. 1A (2008) Voting Data, Socio-Economic and
Demographic-Only Restriction
Variable

Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 1A” PCT08_1A_Y

INC_L_20

0.136***
(0.0075)

INC_20_40

0.0638***
(0.0079)

INC_40_60

0.0352***
(0.0084)

INC_75_100

-0.0499***
(0.0086)

INC_100_P

-0.136***
(0.0070)
0.247***

COLLEGE

(0.0036)
0.203***

BLACK

(0.0043)
0.0748***

ASIAN

(0.0031)
0.0210***

OTHER

(0.0048)
0.143***

HISPANIC

(0.0034)
0.109***

YOUNG

(0.0046)
-0.0373***

OLD

(0.0052)
UNEMPLOY

0.00198
(0.0078)
0.448***

Constant

(0.0070)
23,056

Observations
R-squared

0.719

County fixed
effects?

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

What do these results tell us about the role of socio-economic variables on support for
HSR? Consider first the coefficients on the income variables. The coefficient on the
lowest income variable is 0.136, indicating that precincts with a higher share of lower
income residents tend to vote in favor of the bill. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
lower income residents will support high-speed rail because they are disproportionately
familiar with using public transit. The coefficient on the highest income variable is -0.136
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(coincidentally the same in absolute value as the above mentioned estimated coefficient
to three decimal places). This indicates that precincts with many high income voters voted
disproportionately against Prop. 1A. Moving from the coefficient on the lowest income
group to the coefficient on the highest income group, the estimate drops in a step-wise
fashion from 0.136, to 0.0638, to 0.0352, and so on, indicating that the likelihood of
supporting Prop. 1A falls with income. Note that one income category is excluded from this
regression, the $60,000 to $75,000 category. This is a technical requirement, as otherwise
the sum of the income variables would equal one for each observation, and this will lead
to perfect multicollinearity, a violation of the requirements of OLS.
The other major socio-economic variable included in the table above is unemployment. A
reasonable hypothesis is that precincts with more unemployed voters voted for high-speed
rail, as the project was presented as having stimulus potential. The estimated coefficient
on UNEMPLOY, 0.00198, is very small, and is not statistically different from zero. We
will have more to say about unemployment later in this section, but this finding indicates
that support for high-speed rail does not depend on unemployed voters, as is commonly
thought.
Turning to demographic variables, we consider educational attainment, race and ethnicity, and
age. Precincts in which many of the voters have college degrees are more likely to vote for
Prop. 1A. To illustrate, the findings indicate that a precinct that is one standard deviation above
the mean in terms of college graduates is 5% more likely to vote for Prop. 1A. To calculate this
percentage, we use (from Table 4) the standard deviation for variable COLLEGE (0.21) and
multiply this by (from Table 5) the coefficient on COLLEGE (0.247). The result is 0.0504, or
approximately 5%.
With regard to race and ethnicity, we exclude the White/Caucasian category. Note that the
coefficient estimates on other ethnic groups is positive. This means that, for example, if a
precinct goes from being 25% White and 25% Hispanic (with the remaining some mix of
the other ethnicities) to 20% White and 30% Hispanic, the probability of voting for Prop. 1A
increases by 0.007 (or just over 0.5%).
Finally, we see that younger voters are more likely to support Prop. 1A, as the coefficient
on YOUNG is 0.109, while the coefficient on OLD is -0.373. The category for middle-aged
voters is excluded. The estimates on YOUNG and OLD indicate that as the fraction of the
precinct’s voter age increases toward the OLD category, support for high-speed rail falls.
What do these findings mean for the future of support for HSR? We believe that for many
questions, our results are informative. For example, the state of the economy during a
future election where some aspect of the HSR project is being decided may not have as
large an effect as is commonly believed, as unemployment is not significant. As average
income continues to grow in the United States, support for HSR may decrease, although
as California adds more residents from other states and immigrants from other countries,
many of whom may be low-income, then support for HSR will increase. Thus, the effect of
income depends on how the population changes. In addition, as the population becomes
more educated, our results suggest that support for HSR will increase, but if we add
population that is not college educated, support for HSR will decrease.
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Similarly, it is not perfectly clear how these results translate into predictions regarding the
role of age. As the population ages, it is possible that these aging voters will turn against
HSR. However, these results are also consistent with a world where, as the population
ages, the oldest voters are replaced by the middle-aged. The current middle-aged voters
are less opposed to HSR than the current old voters, and so as the former replaces the
latter, support for HSR may increase.
The preceding paragraphs illustrate how the estimates of our model can be used to inform
policy, both by suggesting what various types of voters demand in terms of HSR, and also
in predicting how demographic and socio-economic changes will shift support for HSR in
future elections.
Next, we look at ideology and urban form. To examine ideology and urban form, we present
the results shown in Table 6.

Table 6.

Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regressions; Prop. 1A (2008) Voting Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 1A”
PCT08_1A_Y

Variable
UNEMPLOY

Socio-economic,
Demographic
Only

Ideology
Only

Urban Form
Only

0.0251***

0.00198
(0.0078)

BUSH

All But
Ideology

(0.0072)

Unrestricted
0.0135***
(0.0051)

-0.549***

-0.457***

(0.0023)

(0.0030)

HOMEOWN

lnDISTANCE

-0.135***

-0.0646***

-0.0459***

(0.0018)

(0.0025)

(0.0018)

-0.0407***

-0.0312***

-0.0077***

(0.0007)

(0.0006)

(0.0004)

0.0099***

lnDENSITY

0.0068***

0.0026***

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

(0.0002)

0.448***

0.756***

0.758***

0.581***

0.709***

(0.0070)

(0.0015)

(0.0051)

(0.0078)

(0.0057)

Observations

23,050

23,078

23,055

23,050

23,025

R-squared

0.719

0.854

0.708

0.766

0.882

County fixed
effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demographic/
SE controls?

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Constant

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10
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Table 6 reports five estimates of equation (1). The information in data column 1 contains
the same information reported in Table 5 (the model restricted to socio-economic and
demographic variables). It is reproduced here so that the coefficient on UNEMPLOY can be
compared across other specifications, and also so that the R-squared from the specification
in Table 5 can be easily compared with others. Table 6 displays a subset of coefficients
on all demographic and socio-economic variables. A complete set of coefficients for the
unrestricted model are displayed in Table 23. Those readers interested in the effect of
these variables on voting should consult Table 23 as well as Table 5.
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that the variable BUSH is a strong predictor of voting against
Prop. 1A. Including county fixed effects but no additional variables, we see that the
variable BUSH explains 85% of the variation in voting preference for Prop. 1A (i.e., the
R-squared is 0.854). As the R-squared is a number between zero and one, this indicates
a very high degree of explanatory power. Indeed, one single variable—BUSH—explains
more than do all of the socio-economic and demographic variables combined, as can
be seen by comparing the R-squared of 0.854 in column 2 to the value from column 1
of 0.719.47 Note that the negative coefficient on BUSH of -0.549 indicates that precincts
with more Republican voters tended to vote against Prop. 1A, and this is consistent with
our expectation that conservative voters are opposed to government transit infrastructure
projects.
Column 3 illustrates the effects of urban form. The R-squared of 0.708 indicates that three
urban form variables – lnDISTANCE, lnDENSITY and HOMEOWN – together explain nearly
as much as do all of the socio-economic and demographic variables. In addition to having
considerable explanatory power, the signs and magnitudes of these coefficients tell an
interesting story about how urban form influences voting. In general, more suburban locations
voted against Prop. 1A. This is consistent with our expectations, as suburban voters have
easy access to automobile infrastructure, are higher income, and so can afford high-quality
cars, and are also farther from transit locations. We see this with a positive coefficient on
population density (denser areas were more likely to vote in favor of Prop. 1A), and negative
coefficients on distance and homeownership (precincts far from the city center were more
likely to vote against the HSR proposition, as were precincts with many homeowners).
The model shown in column 4 includes the urban form variables as well as the demographic
and socio-economic variables. Note of these latter variables, only UNEMPLOY is shown
(the others being repressed to conserve on space). In this specification, the R-squared
value increases to 0.766, still lower than the ideology-only specification, but a statistically
significant increase from the specifications in both columns 1 and 3. Note also that the
urban form variables all decrease in magnitude, when comparing the results from column
3 with those from column 4. This is especially true for HOMEOWN, which decreases by
more than half. The coefficients on lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY also decrease, but by
less than half.
On the other hand, the coefficient on UNEMPLOY in column 4 increases, compared with
the results presented in column 1. The coefficient on UNEMPLOY of 0.0251 indicates that
a district that is one standard deviation above the mean has a 0.07 × 0.0251 = 0.0018
higher probability of voting for Prop. 1A, or 0.18%; this is approximately two-tenths of one
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percent. Thus, although the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is now statistically significant, the
effect of unemployment is still not large.
The final specification reported in column 5 of Table 6 is the unrestricted version of the
model presented in equation (1), as it includes all of the independent variables. Compared
to column 4, this specification controls for ideology. We see that the coefficients on the
urban form variables decrease in magnitude even further when compared to the other
versions. The coefficient on UNEMPLOY also decreases in magnitude but retains statistical
significance (meaning we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is
precisely zero, though it is still very small in magnitude).
The R-squared value in column 5 is 0.882. This suggests that although the ideology variable
explains a lot of the variation in voting for Prop. 1A, the socio-economic, demographic and
urban form variables also contribute explanatory power.
In the remainder of this section, we use the same basic approach as above to delve
deeper into several questions relating to our distance, homeownership and unemployment
variables, and we explore whether voting patterns in California’s Central Valley differ
systematically from voting patterns in the rest of the state.

A Closer Look at Prop. 1A and the Role of Distance
The variable lnDISTANCE used in the models in Table 6 is calculated as the distance from
the center of each block group to center of the downtown of the MSA in which the block
group is a part. Urban economic theory suggests the distance a household lives from
downtown is important. In many cases, the downtown of the MSA will coincide closely
with the location of the HSR station – for example (refer to Figure 5), in each of the cases
of San Francisco, San Jose and Los Angeles, the location used as the downtown of the
MSA is within one mile of the proposed HSR station. However, in other cases, for example
Chico, California, the closest HSR station will be Sacramento. Residents of downtown
Chico will have a low value of lnDISTANCE (distance from downtown), but the distance to
the nearest HSR station will be long.
Given the nature of Prop. 1A, we are interested in testing whether distance to HSR station
predicts voting for Prop. 1A. We calculate a variable we term lnHSRdist, which is the
natural log of the distance from a block group to the nearest HSR station.48
We re-estimate the unrestricted version of the model using lnHSRdist in place of
lnDISTANCE. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that distance to the center of MSA has a
larger influence on voting for Prop. 1A than does distance to the nearest HSR station, in
the sense that the coefficient estimate is larger in the lnDISTANCE case. The coefficient
on lnHSRdist is 0.003, compared to 0.009 for lnDISTANCE. When including both variables
in the model, only lnDISTANCE is significant.
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A Closer Look at Prop. 1A and Homeownership
Next, we test the hypothesis that land values rise near areas where an HSR station is to
be located. We create an interaction variable, INTERACT_HSRdist, where:
INTERACT_HSRdist = lnHSRdist × HOMEOWN
Then, we estimate a new model which his identical to the unrestricted version of equation
(1) but that also includes this interaction variable.
Our hypothesis is that homeowners near stations will be more likely to vote for Prop. 1A,
as they estimate the value of their home will increase as a result of having easier access
to the state’s major population centers. On the other hand, homeowners far from stations
will vote against Prop. 1A, as their access to HSR will be more limited, although their tax
dollars will still be used to repay the bonds used to finance the project.49
However, and again to our surprise, we find the coefficient on HOMEOWN is smaller, i.e.
more negative (-0.059), and the coefficient on the interaction variable is positive (0.0043).
The coefficient on HOMEOWN is not significant, and while the interaction variable is
significant at the 1% level, the coefficient is small (at 0.0043). Thus, there appears to be
little economic significance of the interaction between HOMEOWN and lnHSRdist when
looking across block groups in California.

A Closer Look at Prop. 1A in the Central Valley
The final modification estimates the same interaction model from above, but here we
include only households from Central Valley counties. There are several reasons why we
think voting patterns in California’s Central Valley might differ systematically from voting
patterns in the rest of the state.
First, as discussed above, construction was widely known to be planned to occur between
San Francisco and Los Angeles in the first phase, so Central Valley voters would have
assumed construction would begin relatively soon. Given the higher unemployment in the
Central Valley, it would not have been unreasonable for them to assume that construction
might even start in these counties, as is now planned.50 The Central Valley is less urban
and more agricultural, and the political landscape is more conservative. However, key to
the urban economic theory underlying our analysis is that, by providing fast connections
from the Central Valley to the two main population centers of the state, Central Valley real
estate, particularly properties near HSR stations, becomes more attractive. Therefore,
although our interaction approach, described above, does not reveal a large effect across
the state, we think it will in the Central Valley.51
Second, we examine whether unemployment was a bigger factor among voters in
California’s Central Valley in the Prop. 1A vote. Unemployment in the Central Valley is
higher than in the rest of the state (12.2% versus 8.8% in our sample) and significant
construction would take place first in this region.
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Table 7.

OLS Regression with Homeowner-Distance Interactions in the Central
Valley; Prop. 1A (2008) and Capitalization
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 1A”
PCT08_1A_Y

Variable

0.0296*

UNEMPLOY

(0.02)
-0.343***

BUSH

(0.01)
0.0363**

HOMEOWN

(0.02)
-0.00813**

lnHSRdist

(0.00)
0.00882***

lnDENSITY

(0.00)
INTERACT_HSRdist

-0.0191***
(0.01)
0.624***

Constant

(0.02)
Observations

1,645

R-squared

0.77

Demographic/SE and ideological controls?

Yes

County fixed effects?

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

As one can see in Table 7, the coefficient on UNEMPLOY is about twice the value of that
estimated in the unrestricted, state-wide model (0.0135, from Table 6), but not statistically
significant, at the 5% level. This does not clearly suggest whether or not unemployment
has a differential effect in the Central Valley.
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Figure 6. Marginal Effect Of Homeownership on Voting for Prop. 1A, By Distance
to HSR Station, Central Valley Counties Only
Notes: Marginal effect is calculated as 0.0363-(0.0191× lnHSRdist), units reflect change in predicted probability of voting
yes due to change in homeownership rate.

With respect to distance and homeownership both INTERACT_HSRdist and HOMEOWN
are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. The coefficient on HOMEOWN is
0.0363, while the coefficient on INTERACT_HSRdist is -0.0191. Note that because we are
including the interaction term, the marginal effect of HOMEOWN on voting for Prop. 1A now
depends on the value of lnHSRdist. Specifically, dy/dx is 0.0363-(0.0191×lnHSRdist). The
resulting curve is shown in Figure 6. These results suggest that homeowners nearer HSR
stations are more likely to vote for Prop. 1A, while homeowners farther from HSR stations
are more likely to vote against. The cutoff value occurs where lnHSRdist = .0363/.0191 =
1.90, or 4.2 miles; homeowners closer to HSR stations are predicted to support Prop. 1A
while homeonwers farther away are predicted to oppose Prop. 1A.
Thus, the result of this final hypothesis test, where we analyze only the Central Valley
subsample, is consistent with our expectations.

PROP. 23: SUSPEND AB 32 – THE GLOBAL WARMING SOLUTIONS ACT
(2010)
Prop. 23, had it been approved by voters, would have placed a moratorium on the largest
aspect of California’s aggressive climate change mitigation efforts. Assembly Bill 32 (AB
32) was signed into law in 2006 by Governor Schwarzenegger, and is a landmark piece of
environmental regulation. Thus, to understand Prop. 23, one must begin by understanding
AB 32.
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The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, also known as AB 32, is a California state law
that requires greenhouse gas emissions from all sources throughout the state be reduced
to year 1990 levels by year 2020. This represents emissions reductions of about 25%.52
According to economist Michael Hanemann, “AB 32 is noteworthy because it legislates
a more comprehensive and stringent control on GHG [Greenhouse Gas] emissions than
exists in any other state.”53 The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is charged with
developing regulations and market mechanisms to ensure GHG reduction goals are met
by 2020.54
Prop. 23 would have suspended AB 32 until the unemployment rate fell to 5.5% for one
full year. The specific language voters saw, taken from the 2010 Voter Information Guide
was:55
PROP 23: Suspends implementation of air pollution control law (AB 32) requiring
major sources of emissions to report and reduce greenhouse gas emissions that
cause global warming, until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for full year.
Fiscal Impact: Likely modest net increase in overall economic activity in the state
from suspension of greenhouse gases regulatory activity, resulting in a potentially
significant net increase in state and local revenues.
The passing of AB 32 opened the door to a variety of types of regulations and market
mechanisms targeting GHG emissions. The largest policy in CARB’s toolbox is the cap
and trade system, which in 2013 went into effect for electric utilities and large industrial
facilities, and in 2015, is scheduled to go into effect for distributors of transportation, natural
gas and other fuels.
In addition to the cap and trade system, CARB is responsible for overseeing numerous
regulations, including a first in the country GHG emissions standards for light duty vehicles,
subsequently adopted by other states and the federal government.56 Other regulations are
smaller scale, such as the requirement that automotive service providers check a vehicle’s
tire pressure when performing maintenance or repair service. California gas stations are
also required to provide free compressed air when customers purchase fuel.57 Taken
together, we envision that voters with a large carbon footprint would be opposed to AB 32
(and would thus be more likely to vote yes on Prop. 23) as they see the burden of these
regulations falling disproportionately on them.
Prop. 23 is a transit-related proposition because so many of the policies bundled into AB 32
are intended to change transportation patterns to encourage a more fuel efficient vehicle
fleet and to raise the price of fossil fuels to reflect the negative externalities associated
with their consumption.58 Although the word “transit” does not appear anywhere in the text
of the proposition, Prop. 23, in the United States, the transportation sector accounts for
70% of oil consumption and 30% of GHG emissions.59 Another example of how Prop. 23
is a transit proposition is that some of the revenues from the cap and trade system set up
by CARB pursuant to AB 32 are likely going to be used to finance the HSR project. Thus,
understanding how voters feel about Prop. 23 is crucial for understanding the future of
transit in California and the United States.
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Survey Data
We begin by discussing the survey data we analyze for Prop. 23. The data were collected
by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) in July 2010. Later in this section we
analyze voting data for the same proposition; the use of voting data and survey data to
estimate equations (1) and (2) sheds light on whether the results obtained with survey or
voting are subject to any sort of bias.
This PPIC survey asked about opinions towards global warming in general and AB 32 in
particular, although it did not specifically name Proposition 23. One important characteristic
of these data for our purposes is the availability of zip code identifiers for respondents, thus
allowing us to calculate fairly refined measures of distance to downtown and neighborhood
population density.60
As mentioned, the survey did not ask about Prop. 23, specifically. However, question topics
do relate closely to the issues covered by the proposition, and thus we should be able to
predict how a respondent would vote on Prop. 23 based on their answers to the PPIC
survey questions. In particular, a “favor” (i.e., in favor of) answer to Q19 below suggests
that the respondent would vote “no” on Prop. 23. Even more strongly, a “wait until state
economy and job situation improve” answer to Q21 below suggests the respondent would
vote “yes” on Prop. 23. This is because even if someone agrees with AB 32 in principle, it
is possible they would agree to wait to enforce it.
The survey asked the following five questions that relate to Prop. 23 (response options in
parentheses):
• Q18. How serious of a threat is global warming to the economy and quality of life
for California’s future—do you think that it is a very serious, somewhat serious, not
too serious, or not at all serious of a threat? (very serious, somewhat serious, not
too serious, not at all serious)
• Q19. Next, to address global warming, do you favor or oppose the state law that
requires California to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions back to 1990 levels by
the year 2020? (favor, oppose)
• Q20. Do you favor or oppose the California state government making its own
policies, separate from the federal government, to address the issue of global
warming? (favor, oppose)
• Q21. When it comes to the state government’s plans for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, should it [ROTATE] [1] take action right away [OR SHOULD IT] [2] wait
until the state economy and job situation improve to take action? (favor, oppose)
• Q22. Do you think the government should or should not regulate the release of
greenhouse gases from sources like power plants, cars, and factories in an effort to
reduce global warming? (should, should not)
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Our analysis contains similar explanatory variables to those we use in the analysis of Prop.
1A, except the variables relate to individuals rather than block groups All of these variables
are contained in the PPIC survey data, except for two. As mentioned, the PPIC survey
provides zip code identifiers for respondents, and we use these to calculate population
density at the zip code tabulation area (ZCTA) level. Similarly, we calculate the distance
from the center of each respondent’s ZCTA to the downtown of the MSA in which that
respondent lives. Descriptions of all variables are presented in Table 8.

Table 8.

Description of Variables Used in Analysis of PPIC Survey Data

Variable*

Description

NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT

Respondent believes global warming is not a threat

OPPOSE_AB32

Respondent opposes AB 32

OPPOSE_CA_ACTION

Respondent opposes state action on global warming

AGREE_WAIT

Respondent believe state should wait until economy improves before reducing
GHG emissions

OPPOSE_REGULATE

Respondent opposes regulating GHG emissions

PROP23INDEX

The sum of the first five variables listed in this table

INC_L_20

Respondent’s income is less than $20,000

INC_20_40

Respondent’s income is between $20,000-$40,000

INC_40_60

Respondent’s income is between $40,000-$60,000

INC_80_100

Respondent’s income is between $80,000-$100,000

INC_100_P

Respondent’s income is greater than $100,000

COLLEGE

Respondent has college degree or higher

BLACK

Respondent answered “Black” to race and ethnicity question

ASIAN

Respondent answered “Asian” to race and ethnicity question

OTHER

Respondent answered “Other” to race and ethnicity question

HISPANIC

Respondent answered “Hispanic” to race and ethnicity question

YOUNG

Respondent’s age is between 18 and 34 years

OLD

Respondent’s age is 65 years or older

UNEMPLOY

Respondent is unemployed

REP

Respondent is registered as a Republican

lnDISTANCE

Natural log of distance in kilometers from respondent’s household to CBD

lnZIPDEN

Natural log of population density (persons per sq. mi.) in respondent’s zip code

HOMEOWNER

Respondent owns home

Note: *All of the variables are indicator (zero or one) variables, except for PROP23INDEX, lnDISTANCE and
lnDENSITY.

In short, based on the five questions reproduced above, we have five measures that
indicate how each respondent would vote on Prop. 23. To conserve space, we combine
these variables into a summary measure which we title PROP23INDEX and use this as
the dependent variable in the analyses below.61 The variable PROP23INDEX is the sum
of the first five variables listed in Table 8. We also define a number of socio-economic,
demographic, ideological and urban form variables. And, we have data on all the variables
that are required to estimate equation (2). We also analyze responses to each of the five
questions separately. These results can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 9 contains a correlation matrix for the five Prop. 23 questions listed above, as well as
the summary PROP23INDEX measure. As one can see, the correlation between the index
variable and the individual responses ranges from approximately 0.65 to 0.79. Table 9
also reveals that, although the five Prop. 23 measures are related to each other, they also
emphasize different aspects of attitudes towards the policy. The correlation between the
five raw questions ranges from 0.56 (between NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT and OPPOSE_
AB32) to a low of 0.26 (between OPPOSE_CA_ACTION and AGREE_WAIT).

Table 9.

Correlation Between Measures of Support for Climate Change Policy,
PPIC Survey Data
PROP23
INDEX

NOT_SERIOUS_
THREAT

OPPOSE_
AB32

OPPOSE_CA_
ACTION

AGREE_
WAIT

PROP23INDEX

1

NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT

0.78

1

OPPOSE_AB32

0.79

0.56

1

OPPOSE_CA_ACTION

0.65

0.34

0.41

1

AGREE_WAIT

0.72

0.52

0.42

0.26

1

OPPOSE_REGULATE

0.75

0.54

0.54

0.34

0.41

OPPOSE_
REGULATE

1

Table 10 contains summary statistics for the complete set of variables. The mean value of
PROP23INDEX is 1.65, which means that the average respondent indicated support for
Prop. 23 through his responses to nearly two of the core questions listed above. Looking
at the individual questions, 44% of respondents agreed that California should wait until the
economy improves before reducing GHG emissions, and this was the question in which
the most anti-mitigation sentiments were expressed. This figure is also fairly close to the
38.4% of voters that ultimately supported Prop. 23.
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Table 10. Summary Statistics, 2010 PPIC Survey Data
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

PROP23INDEX

2,183

1.65

1.53

0

5

NOT_SERIOUS_THREAT

2,183

0.3

0.35

0

1

OPPOSE_AB32

2,183

0.28

0.42

0

1

OPPOSE_CA_ACTION

2,183

0.38

0.47

0

1

AGREE_WAIT

2,183

0.44

0.48

0

1

OPPOSE_REGULATE

2,183

0.22

0.40

0

1

INC_L_20

2,063

0.19

0.39

0

1

INC_20_40

2,063

0.20

0.40

0

1

INC_40_60

2,063

0.15

0.36

0

1

INC_80_100

2,063

0.11

0.31

0

1

INC_100_P

2,063

0.24

0.43

0

1

COLLEGE

2,183

0.42

0.49

0

1

BLACK

2,183

0.21

0.41

0

1

ASIAN

2,183

0.12

0.33

0

1

OTHER

2,183

0.17

0.37

0

1

HISPANIC

2,183

0.24

0.43

0

1

YOUNG

2,183

0.33

0.47

0

1

OLD

2,183

0.13

0.34

0

1

UNEMPLOY

2,183

0.07

0.26

0

1

REP

2,183

0.25

0.43

0

1

lnDISTANCE

2,183

2.99

0.88

-1.56

4.60

lnZIPDEN

2,168

7.99

1.48

1.58

10.89

HOMEOWNER

2,055

0.61

0.49

0

1

Source: For all variables except lnDISTANCE and lnZIPDEN: Public Policy Institute of California, Statewide Survey,
July 2010, “Californians and the Environment.” The source for lnDISTANCE and lnZIPDEN are author’s calculations,
based on U.S. Census figures.

The first set of regression results using the survey data focuses on demographic and
socio-economic variables, and these are shown in Table 11. (We emphasize that these
models are not linear probability models as the dependent variable ranges from zero to
five, and caution must be taken when comparing these results to those from the analysis of
the voting data, a comparison we make Table 16.) We begin by describing the estimates of
the coefficients on the socio-economic variables. The coefficients on the income variables
show that support is highest among the excluded income category (INC_60_80); being in
any other income category lowers support for Prop. 23 relative to the excluded category.
Although the two highest income categories are less likely to favor Prop. 23 (as measured
by the PROP23INDEX variable) than the excluded category, by far, the two lowest income
categories most strongly oppose Prop. 23. This is to say, we find a non-linear relationship
between support for Prop. 23 and income level, with both low-income and high-income
groups opposed, but the low-income groups more strongly opposed. However, only the
coefficients on the two lowest income groups are statistically significant.
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The coefficient on unemployment is negative but not statistically significant. One would
expect a positive and significant coefficient on unemployment, as Prop. 23 had a strong
employment aspect to it.
In Appendix B, we present results where we analyze linear probability models that use
each of the five individual questions as dependent variables. In these models, we would
expect unemployment to be most strongly related to the AGREE_WAIT question. We,
indeed, do find this to be the case. However, even in this model, the coefficient estimate
on UNEMPLOY is not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Turning to demographics, we again include age, education and race/ethnicity variables.
Young voters tend to oppose Prop. 23, while older voters tend to support it. These
estimates are highly significant. On the other hand, although more educated voters (those
with a college degree) tend to oppose Prop. 23, as shown by the negative coefficient on
COLLEGE of -0.0969, this coefficient is not statistically different from zero. Finally, we
do not find a strong relationship among the race and ethnicity variables with respect to
potential Prop. 23 vote preference. With the exception of the OTHER variable (which is
the catchall category for a respondent not fitting into one of the named race or ethnicity
categories), none of the coefficients is statistically significant.
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Table 11. OLS Regression, Prop. 23, 2010 Survey Data, Socio-Economic and
Demographic-Only Restriction

Variable

Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Index of Support for Prop. 23”
PROP23INDEX

INC_L_20

-0.520***
(0.1290)

INC_20_40

-0.560***
(0.1220)

INC_40_60

-0.129
(0.1260)

INC_80_100

-0.0383
(0.1370)

INC_100_P

-0.0992

COLLEGE

-0.0969

(0.1190)
(0.6570)
0.0659

BLACK

(0.6630)
ASIAN

-0.517
(0.6670)
-0.290***

OTHER

(0.1040)
HISPANIC

0.219
(0.6630)
-0.340***

YOUNG

(0.0765)
0.419***

OLD

(0.1030)
-0.0968

UNEMPLOY

(0.1300)
1.708**

Constant

(0.6890)
Observations

2,063

R-squared

0.134

Adjusted R-squared

0.112

County fixed effects?

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

We next turn to the regression results using the survey data that focus on ideology and
urban form. These are presented in Table 12.
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Table 12. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regression; Prop. 23, 2010 Survey Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
PROP23INDEX

Variable
UNEMPLOY

Socio-economic,
Demographic
Only

All But
Ideology

Unrestricted

-0.0968

-0.0682

0.0116

(0.1300)

(0.1390)

(0.1290)

REP

Ideology
Only

1.513***

1.352***

(0.0687)

(0.0779)
0.0756

lnDISTANCE
lnZIPDEN

0.087

0.0276

(0.0589)

(0.0593)

(0.0551)

-0.125***

-0.106***

-0.0867**

(0.0379)

(0.0383)

(0.0355)

0.242***

HOMEOWNER
Constant

Urban Form
Only

-0.125

-0.0896

(0.0712)

(0.0852)

(0.0792)

1.708**

1.208***

1.981***

2.157***

2.186***

(0.6890)

(0.1450)

(0.4900)

(0.8270)

(0.7680)

Observations

2,063

2,183

2,040

1,937

1,937

R-squared

0.134

0.236

0.083

0.14

0.259

Adjusted R-squared

0.112

0.222

0.065

0.116

0.238

County fixed effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demographic/SE controls?

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

Table 12 reveals some interesting findings. First, as with the voting data we analyzed with
Prop. 1A, a single variable, ideology explains more than all of the socio-economic and
demographic variables. We see this by comparing the R-squared value in column 2, which
contains only the variable REP (and county fixed effects), with that in column 1, which
includes all the demographic and socio-economic variables (and county fixed effects).62
The positive coefficient on REP means that Republicans are more likely to support Prop.
23. Another way of interpreting the results in column 2 is that a Republican is likely to
answer “yes” to 1.513+1.208=2.722 of the five Prop. 23-related questions. This is the sum
of the coefficients estimates for REP (1.513) and the CONSTANT (1.208).63
In column 3 of Table 12 we see that the urban form variables all have the expected signs.
The results suggest that the farther a person lives from downtown (lnDISTANCE), the more
likely he or she is to vote for Prop. 23, and that the higher the population density of the
neighborhood (represented by lnZIPDEN), the less likely that resident is to vote for Prop.
23. This is consistent with the idea that suburban residents face a higher burden of carbon
mitigation regulation. Similarly, the coefficient on HOMEOWN is positive and significant,
suggesting that suburban residents (who are more likely to own their home) support Prop.
23. This positive coefficient is also consistent with homeowners believing Prop. 23 will
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lower the value of that, for most households, which is their single largest asset. We revisit
this idea later. Of these three variables, only lnZIPDEN is statistically significant.
In column 4, we include urban form and demographic variables. The biggest change we
see when comparing the results in column 4 to those in column 3 is that the coefficient on
HOMEOWN changes from positive and significant to negative and insignificant. Controlling
for socio-economic and demographic variables eliminates the statistical significance
of HOMEOWN. Note also that the marginal contribution to explanatory power of the
demographic variables is fairly large as the adjusted R-squared in column 4 of 0.116, is
larger than the adjusted R-squared in column 3 of 0.0653.
Finally, column 5 presents the estimates of our unrestricted model. While the estimate
of the coefficient on the HOMEOWN variable is shown not to be robust to demographic
controls, the lnZIPDEN variable is robust to the inclusion of socio-economic, demographic
and ideological variables, and the coefficient estimate of -0.0867, while smaller than in
other columns, remains large in magnitude.

VOTING DATA
We continue the analysis of Prop. 23, by turning to the voting data. Our intention is to
estimate the same versions of equation (1) as are shown in Table 5 and Table 6 for the
analysis of Prop. 1A. In the discussion of the Prop. 23 results, we highlight only the
significant differences between the results of the voting data and survey data analyses.
Summary statistics for the voting data are given in Table 4, at the beginning of this chapter.
The results of our first analysis of Prop. 23 voting data are reported in Table 13. Here, we
see a positive, approximately linear relationship between income and support for Prop. 23.
We also see that unemployment is positive and marginally significant.
College-degreed voters opposed Prop. 23, on average, and unlike the individual regressions,
the results suggest both young and old voters opposed Prop. 23, on average (with middleaged voters, the excluded category, being most likely to have supported it). Finally, the
race and ethnicity variables suggest that Black and Hispanic voters were opposed to Prop.
23, relative to the excluded (White) category.
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Table 13. OLS Regression, Prop. 23, 2010 Voting Data, Socio-Economic and
Demographic-Only Restriction
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 23”
PCT_23_Y

Variable
INC_L_20

-0.0952***
(0.0081)

INC_20_40

-0.0572***
(0.0085)

INC_40_60

-0.0400***
(0.0090)

INC_75_100

0.0430***
(0.0093)

INC_100_P

0.159***
(0.0075)
-0.325***

COLLEGE

(0.0038)
-0.205***

BLACK

(0.0047)
ASIAN

0.0031
(0.0034)
-0.0180***

OTHER

(0.0053)
-0.130***

HISPANIC

(0.0037)
YOUNG

-0.0605***

OLD

-0.0104*

(0.0050)
(0.0054)
0.0158*

UNEMPLOY

(0.0084)
0.409***

Constant

(0.0075)
Observations

23,066

R-squared

0.726

County fixed effects?

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

Next we turn to discuss ideology and urban form, using the voting data. Table 14 contains
these results.
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Table 14. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regressions; Prop. 23, 2010 Voting Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 23”
PCT_23_Y

Variable
UNEMPLOY

Socio-economic,
Demographic
Only

Ideology
Only

Urban Form
Only

0.0158*
(0.0084)

BUSH

All But
Ideology

Unrestricted

-0.00675

0.00721

(0.0076)

(0.0044)

0.553***

0.549***

(0.0022)

(0.0026)
0.0809***

HOMEOWN

(0.0019)
0.0472***

lnDISTANCE
lnDENSITY

0.0240***
(0.0027)
0.0377***

0.0012
(0.0016)
0.00954***

(0.0007)

(0.0006)

(0.0004)

-0.0107***

-0.0106***

-0.00566***

(0.0004)

(0.0003)

(0.0002)

0.108***

0.125***

0.307***

0.153***

(0.0075)

(0.0014)

(0.0054)

(0.0083)

(0.0049)

Observations

23,066

23,088

23,071

23,066

23,033

R-squared

0.726

0.89

Constant

0.409***

0.716

0.777

0.925

County fixed effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demographic/SE controls?

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

Table 14 shows the results when including ideology, urban form, or all (unrestricted)
variables. The specification in column 1 is identical to that in Table 13 and is reproduced to
facilitate comparison between the various restrictions we impose on equation (1). Column
2 shows the ideology-only results of the regression of PCT_23_Y on BUSH with fixed
county effects; note again the high level of explanatory power when including only this
ideology variable and county fixed effects.
Column 3 shows the results of the regression model with only three urban form variables.
Here, we see that suburbanites voted against GHG mitigation; that is, in favor of Prop.
23. This is seen especially by the positive coefficients on lnDISTANCE and negative
coefficients on lnDENSTY. However, the magnitude of the urban form coefficients
decreases in column 4 when demographic controls are added, particularly the coefficient
on HOMEOWN. Column 5 shows the results of the unrestricted model. We see that two
urban form variables (lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY) retain their statistical significance
even when controlling for ideology and other variables, though the magnitudes decrease
considerably.
Nonetheless, the results confirm our expectations from Hypothesis 1, that because
suburban residents perceive that the incidence of a GHG regulatory regime falls more
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heavily on them, they are more likely, on average, to vote against GHG mitigation efforts
compared to urban residents.64
We close this section with a comparison between the results obtained with survey and voting
data for Prop. 23, and also by testing our Hypotheses 2 and 3. We test these hypotheses
next, by taking a examining Prop. 23 voting preferences with respect to homeownership.

A Closer Look at Prop. 23 and Homeownership
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate an interaction model identical to the model
of Prop. 1A, that we discuss in the subsection titled A Closer Look at Prop. 1A and
Homeownership. The analysis presented here differs from that analysis in two ways. First,
the dependent variable is PCT_23_Y, not PCT_1A_Y. Second, we use as the distance
measure the distance to downtown rather than the distance to the nearest HSR station. In
all other ways the models are identical and we refer the reader to the Prop. 1A discussion,
above, for full model details.
The results presented in Table 15 confirm Hypotheses 2 and 3. Interpreting the results
requires looking at two coefficient estimates, the estimate on HOMEOWN (−0.0410),
and the estimate on the HOMEOWN/lnDISTANCE interaction (0.0141, represented by
variable INTERACT). These estimates suggest that if the homeownership rate increases
in downtown neighborhoods, support for Prop. 23 will decrease. This is consistent with
Hypothesis 2.
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Table 15. OLS Regression with Homeowner-Distance Interactions;
Prop. 23 (2010) and Capitalization
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 23”
PCT_23_Y

Variable

-0.0410***

HOMEOWN

(0.00)
0.00159**

lnDISTANCE

(0.00)
-0.00548***

lnDENSITY

(0.00)
0.0141***

INTERACT

(0.00)
0.176***

Constant

(0.01)
Observations

23,033

R-squared

0.925

Demographic/SE and
Ideology controls?

Yes

County fixed effects?

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

To illustrate, consider the effect of a 10% increase in the homeownership rate downtown.
The interaction model above predicts that the probability of this downtown precinct
supporting Prop. 23 will decrease by:
-0.041 × 0.1 = -0.0041, or -0.41%
that is, a decrease of 0.41% (less than a half-percentage point). In a neighborhood at the
urban fringe (where lnDISTANCE takes on its maximum value of 4.4),65 the effect of a 10%
increase in homeownership is:
(-0.041 × 0.1) + (0.0141 × 4.4 × 0.1) = 0.0021, or 0.21%
that is, slightly more than a two-tenths of one percent increase in support for Prop. 23).
These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 3, which in turn (like Hypothesis 2) is
derived from the predictions of the monocentric city model from urban economics, which
predicts that when the cost of transportation increase (e.g., as gas stations charge more
for gas due to the cost of complying with the mandatory compressed air filling regulations,
or more importantly, when the cap and trade requirements for oil refineries producing
vehicle fuels causes the wholesale price of gasoline to rise), land values will rise in the
city center and fall at the urban fringe.66 Our findings suggest the urban economics model
helps explain voting decisions.
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Marginal Effect of Homeownership on Voting for Prop. 23,
By Distance to Downtown

Notes: Marginal effect is calculated as -0.041+(0.0141× lnDISTANCE), units reflect change in predicted probability of
voting yes due to change in homeownership rate.

Figure 7 plots the marginal effect of homeownership on voting for Prop. 23, by distance.
Increasing the homeownership rate near the city center leads to a loss of support for Prop.
23, while increasing the homeownership rate near the urban fringe leads to an increase in
support for Prop. 23. This is precisely what we would expect to find if the AB 32 regulations
increased the cost of GHG emissions, and if voters voted in a way to maximize their home
values.

Comparing Results: Survey and Voting Data
The final Prop. 23 issues we consider are the comparability of the findings between the
voting and survey data. We have already addressed these issues to some extent in our
discussion of the results using voting data for Prop. 23. But, here, we distill these findings
into an easy to read summary table (Table 16). The difference between the former analyses
and this one is that here we make the comparison across estimates contained in Table 23
(displayed later in this chapter) and Table 27 (in Appendix B), using the more appropriate,
unrestricted regressions.67
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Table 16. Comparing Coefficient Estimates from Analysis of Survey and Voting
Data for Prop. 23
Variable/Category

Coefficient Estimates Results

lnDISTANCE

Positive in both analyses, but statistically significant only in the voting data.

lnDENSITY

Negative and significant in both analyses.

HOMEOWN

Positive in the voting data, negative in the survey data, and not significant in either.*

INCOME

Shows more support for Prop. 23 among the highest income voters in the voting data, but
shows support is highest among middle income groups in the survey data; both sets have
some significant and some insignificant estimates.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Positive and insignificant in both.

AGE

Shows young voters are against Prop. 23 in both data sets, and statistically significant in the
survey data only. However, estimates from the voting data show old voters are also against
Prop. 23 (with estimates statistically significant), but the survey data shows old voters are for
Prop. 23 (and this effect was statistically significant).

COLLEGE

Shows that the educated are against Prop. 23 in both data sets, but statistically significant
only in the voting data.

RACE/ETHNICITY

Shows all non-White groups support Prop. 23, with significant estimates in the voting data; in
the survey data, no estimates are statistically significant.**

IDEOLOGY

Shows conservative voters are for Prop. 23 in both datasets, and in all cases this variable is
statistically significant.

Notes: * See discussion of interaction terms above in the text; homeownership is statistically significant in the voting
data, but the effect depends on whether the location in question is suburban or urban.
** The exception here is for the OTHER category, which, as explained above, is a residual category for respondents
not falling into one of the four named race/ethnicity groups.

In addition to comparing coefficient estimates for Prop. 23 across Tables 23 and 27, we
also use the survey data to estimate the interaction model described above for Prop. 23
(where we include the variable INTERACT to test Hypotheses 2 and 3). In the survey
data, the estimated coefficient on the interaction is negative but not significant. Likewise,
the coefficient on HOMEOWN is negative but not significant. Thus, we do not find the
same support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the survey data as we do in the voting data.
This could be evidence of an inference bias, but it is also possible that the relatively small
survey sample size yields small standard errors. Among the other possible explanations
is that the distance measure, based on ZCTAs, is not calculated at a sufficiently refined
geographical level.
Taken together, comparing results across survey and voting data shows that the results
regarding Hypothesis 1 are quite robust with regard to Prop. 23. The results concerning
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are less robust as they are not statistically significant in the survey
data. Nonetheless, we feel that, on the whole, the results of our analysis lend support to
the monocentric city model.

PROP. 181: PASSENGER RAIL AND CLEAN AIR BOND ACT (1994)
The proposition analyzed in this report’s final case study is Prop. 181, the Passenger Rail
and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994. Before describing the details of this proposition, we first
provide a brief history of ballot propositions from the early 1990s, because it is important to
appreciate the special context of that time. Later in this report we provide more details on

Mineta Tra n s p o rt a t io n I n s t it u t e

California Ballot Initiatives Case Studies

49

propositions from this time, as well as for all transit-related ballot propositions from 1990
to 2010.
From a public transit perspective, a number of fascinating propositions were considered in
California in the early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1994, no less than eight propositions had
a distinct transit component, with three winning majority support. Among these propositions
were two proposals to increase the gasoline tax, one of which passed. We discuss these
gas tax propositions at greater length in the next section. Another three propositions were
legislative bond initiatives, known as the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Acts of 1990,
1992 and 1994, respectively.
Prop. 108, the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990, was the first of these three
major bond acts and was approved by 56% of voters. The bonds that were ultimately sold
as a result of Prop. 108 provided state funding for light rail and other transit projects around
the state, which were also funded with various local sources.68 Prop. 156, the Passenger
Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992, was defeated by a narrow margin.
Prop. 181, the Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994, was also defeated. After
the 1994 election, a transit-related ballot proposition would not appear on the ballot for
another four years. Few, if any, of the subsequent propositions focused so heavily on
transit. Indeed, it is fair to say that the early 1990s was a unique time for understanding
Californians attitudes towards transit as well as various funding mechanisms for transit
infrastructure.
A good description of this proposition69 explains that Prop. 181 is a:
$1 billion legislative bond act that provides funds for acquisition of rights of way, capital
expenditures and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, and rail
transit programs. Background: In 1989, transit organizations and legislators agreed
on a 10 year, $60 billion mass transit program. Approximately $18 billion was to be
provided from state resources for capital outlay, and the rest from the federal and local
governments. The first parts of the state program included two bond measures and a
permanent gasoline tax increase Propositions 108, 111 and 116 and were approved
by a slim margin in 1990. Two subsequent, $1 billion bond proposals, one in 1992 and
the other in 1994, were placed on the ballot by the Legislature. The 1992 proposal,
Proposition 156, failed. Proposition 181 is the 1994 $1 billion bond proposal.
This concludes our background discussion of this proposition. In the remainder of this
section we analyze in detail Prop. 181 from 1994.70

Voting Data
Table 17 contains summary statistics for all of the variables used in the analysis below.71
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Table 17. Summary Statistics, 1990 Census and Voting Data Variables
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

PCT_181_Y

21,266

0.37

0.13

0

1

INC0

20,924

0.20

0.15

0

1

INC25

20,924

0.20

0.11

0

1

INC50

20,924

0.21

0.09

0

1

INC100

20,924

0.20

0.13

0

1

INC150

20,924

0.07

0.11

0

1

COLLEGE

21,013

0.23

0.17

0

1

BLACK

21,021

0.07

0.16

0

1

ASIAN

21,021

0.08

0.11

0

1

OTHER

21,021

0.12

0.16

0

1

HISPANIC

21,021

0.23

0.24

0

1

YOUNG

21,021

0.29

0.12

0

1

OLD

21,021

0.12

0.10

0

1

BUSH

21,098

0.38

0.17

0

1

HOMEOWN

20,924

0.58

0.27

0

1

lnDISTANCE

20,452

2.80

0.83

0.03

4.39

lnDENSITY

21,461

7.04

2.10

0

10.95

Source: Census of Population and Housing, 1990, and SWDB voting data from 1994.

Table 18 presents our first set of regression results. As in the first two case study analyses,
these results are from a restricted version of equation (1), which includes only socioeconomic and demographic variables. With this restriction we are interested in the effects
of these variables only.
Table 18 demonstrates, as predicted, that higher income is associated with less support
for transit. Support for transit is higher when a larger fraction of the block group has a
college degree. Higher proportions of non-White racial and ethnic groups are associated
with support for transit, and this is most pronounced for the Black variable, somewhat
pronounced for the Hispanic variable, and only slightly positive for the Asian variable. As
predicted, higher proportions of elderly voters are associated with support for Prop. 181.
Next we explore the robustness of the coefficient estimates on the socio-economic and
demographic variables. Looking at the coefficients on the income and demographic variables
in the unrestricted version of the model (presented in column 3 of Table 22 in Chapter III), we
see the income effect is less pronounced compared to the estimates in Table 18 (a restricted
regression). The coefficients on the two lowest income groups remain statistically significant,
but the values are less than half those in the restricted case. The coefficients on the highest
income groups become statistically insignificant in this full specification. The coefficient on the
COLLEGE variable remains (statistically) significant and decreases in magnitude by about
40%. All the racial and ethnic coefficients remain significant and decrease in magnitude by
about half. Finally, among the age variables, only OLD remains significant, and it decreases
to about one-third of the size reported in Table 18.
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Table 18. OLS Regression; Prop. 181 (1994) Voting Data, Socio-Economic and
Demographic-Only Restriction
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 181A”
PCT_181_Y

Variable

0.168***

INC0

(0.0075)
0.0843***

INC25

(0.0085)
INC50

0.0393***

INC100

-0.0609***

INC150

-0.0945***

(0.0093)
(0.0087)
(0.0079)
0.367***

COLLEGE

(0.0041)
0.329***

BLACK

(0.0035)
0.0442***

ASIAN

(0.0042)
0.0563***

OTHER

(0.0079)
0.139***

HISPANIC

(0.0055)
0.0741***

YOUNG

(0.0056)
0.0389***

OLD

(0.0057)
0.236***

Constant

(0.0069)
Observations

20,837

R-squared

0.781

County fixed effects?

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

Table 19 presents the regression results for all of the specifications we estimated. As
above, we do not report estimates of coefficients on the demographic variables, to conserve
space.
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Table 19. Restricted and Unrestricted OLS Regressions; Prop. 181, 1994 Voting Data
Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable
“Percent Voting Yes on Prop. 181”
PCT_181_Y

Variable

Socio-economic,
Demographic
Only

Ideology
Only

Urban Form
Only

All But
Ideology

-0.488***

BUSH

-0.345***

(0.0030)
HOMEOWN
lnDISTANCE

Constant

(0.0038)
-0.0983***

-0.0184***

-0.0219***

(0.0022)

(0.0029)

(0.0024)

-0.0494***

-0.0265***

-0.0158***

(0.0008)

(0.0007)

(0.0006)

0.00425***

lnDENSITY

Unrestricted

0.00464***

(0.0004)

(0.0003)

0.236***

0.602***

0.640***

0.333***

0.00142***
(0.0003)
0.486***

(0.0069)

(0.0019)

(0.0053)

(0.0085)

(0.0074)

Observations

20,837

21,020

19,805

19,800

19,723

R-squared

0.781

0.787

0.663

0.802

0.859

County fixed
effects?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Demographic/
SE controls?

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

The first finding to note from Table 19 is that one variable, BUSH, the fraction voting for
the Republican president in the 1992 election (which is our proxy for ideology) explains
slightly more than all of the socio-economic and demographic variables combined. This
is evident by the R-squared value of 0.781 in column 1, and the higher value of 0.787 in
column 2. Analysis in column 3 that includes only the three urban form variables (and
with the county fixed effects) results in a lower R-squared value of 0.663, while including
demographic variables and urban form variables (column 4) raises the R-squared value to
0.802. Finally, in the unrestricted specification (column 5), we note the R-squared is 0.859.
These values can be used to assess how well the model fits the data, with larger values
indicating better fit.
It is also important to note how the coefficient estimates change when subjected to various
levels of control. As noted above, the general pattern depicted in the discussion of the
socio-economic and demographic only specification (where all effects are less pronounced
when subjected to the full set of controls). The same pattern holds true for the ideology
and urban form variables. The coefficient on ideology (BUSH) decreases in magnitude
from -0.488 to -0.345 when no variables are restricted. As for the urban form variables,
in column 3 the coefficient on HOMEOWN is -0.0983, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is
-0.0494, and the coefficient on lnDENSITY is 0.00425. All of these coefficient estimates
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decrease to about 25% of the restricted-model values when subjected to the full set of
controls (unrestricted model). However, while the magnitude of the effects is lower in the
unrestricted model than in the restricted model, we consistently find statistically significant
coefficient estimates, lending support for our Hypothesis 1 regarding suburbanization and
voting.
Finally, to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the same interaction model presented in
the first two case studies. We do not report these results here to conserve space, but we
note that the results are inconsistent with our expectations. The coefficient on HOMEOWN
(is -0.09 while on INTERACT it is positive) 0.024. This suggests that homeownership
downtown reduces support for Prop. 181, while homeownership in the distant suburbs is
associated with a slight increase in support for Prop. 181. This is exactly counter to our
expectations and we do not have a good explanation for what may be driving these results.
Thus, the results of our hypotheses regarding Prop. 181 are mixed. We find strong support
for Hypothesis 1 here, as above. However, although we find strong support for Hypotheses
2 and 3 in the first two case studies, here, not only do we not find support, but we find
evidence that is exactly opposite of our expectations. At this point, all we can do is suggest
that future research attempt to sort this out.
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III. ALL TRANSIT-RELATED CALIFORNIA STATE BALLOT
INITIATIVES, 1990-2010
As discussed in the Introduction, this is a study of 20 transit-related California ballot
propositions from 1990 through 2010. We were able to find survey data, voting data, or
both, for nineteen of these. In four cases we analyze only survey data, in fourteen cases
we analyze only voting data, and in one case we analyze both. Table 20 indicates the
availability of data for each proposition, and, for convenience, it also reproduces information
about the propositions (e.g., percent in favor) from Table 2 from the Introduction.

Year

Month

Proposition
Number

% Yes Vote

Survey Data

Voting Data

Table 20. Data Sources and Summary Information for Ballot Propositions

2010

Nov

23

Suspend AB 32 until unemployment is below 5.5% for one year

38.4





2010

Nov

22

Transportation Funding Protection

60.7



2008

Nov

1A

California High-Speed Rail Bond. S.B. 1856

52.7



2008

Nov

10

Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy

40.5



2008

Feb

91

Transportation Funding Protection

41.6



2006

Nov

1A

Transportation Funding Protection

77.0



2006

Nov

1B

Air Quality, and Port Security Bond Act

61.4



2006

Nov

87

Alternative energy. Tax on California oil producers

45.4



2002

Nov

51

Transportation Protection of Motor Vehicle Sales Tax

42.2



2002

Mar

42

Transportation Congestion Improvement Act

69.1

1998

Nov

2

Transportation Funding Protection

75.4



1998

Nov

7

Air Quality Improvement

43.6



1994

Nov

181

Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994

34.9



1994

Nov

185

Public Transportation Trust Funds. Gasoline Sales Tax

19.5



1992

Nov

156

Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992

48.1



1992

Nov

157

Toll Roads and Highways

28.2



1990

Nov

125

Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax. Rail Transit Funding

45.6

1990

Jun

108

Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990

56.3



1990

Jun

111

Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990

52.4



1990

Jun

116

Rail Transportation. Bond Act

53.3



Name/Description



Source: California Secretary of State Office (Debra Bowen), “Statewide Election Results,” http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/statewide-elections/ (Accessed March 10, 2013).

In this section we estimate our unrestricted model for each of the propositions, where
possible. Doing this is possible for all 15 of the propositions for which we have voting data.
However, only one of the four propositions for which we have survey data contains enough
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variables to estimate the unrestricted model. Nonetheless, we come quite close to our goal
of estimating either equation (1) or equation (2) for each proposition.
The propositions we analyze in this section cover a diverse array of transit issues. An
implication of this is that we do not view the results as providing systematic tests of our
hypotheses. For example, the hypotheses we posit require the net benefits of the proposed
policies to vary spatially. It is not clear, for example, that transportation funding protection
propositions have net benefits that vary spatially, and there are other propositions about
which this fact would also apply.
Therefore, in the discussion below, although we touch on hypothesis tests, our aim
here is not primarily to test hypotheses, but rather to look at all transportation-related
ballot propositions through a common lens. We view the results we present below as a
useful resource for future researchers who may have a particular interest in one of the
propositions that was not our focus. To the extent possible, we also attempt to draw out
similarities and broad themes in the results, but we emphasize that much of the discussion
related to these results is more speculative in nature, compared to the much more careful
hypothesizing presented in the three case studies of the previous chapter.

SURVEY DATA
Before presenting regression results, we briefly describe the new sources of data analyzed
below, beginning with survey data sources. Three Field Poll surveys from 1990 contain
questions about Propositions 108, 111, and 116. We analyze one of these surveys.72 We
describe the source of this data and the specific surveys analyzed in the Data Appendix.
Thus, to study Props 108, 111, and 116 we utilize a single Field Poll survey. Unfortunately,
while the survey we analyze from 1990 contains information on the respondent’s county,
it does not contain information at a more refined geographic area (e.g., zip code), and this
fact prohibits us from estimating the unrestricted version of equation (2) for Propositions
108, 111, and 116.
To study Prop. 42 from 2002, we analyze another Field Poll survey.73 The 2002 Field Poll
survey contained questions about Prop. 42 and also contained zip code identifiers for
respondents.74 The large majority of Field Poll surveys that we pre-screened did not have
zip identifiers, and so we were fortunate to locate a survey that asked about a transportation
proposition and included zip code identifiers.75

VOTING DATA
As with the analysis of Prop. 181, SWDB voting data from 1992 and 1994 elections are
merged with 1990 Census data for block groups. For propositions from the 1998 and 2002
elections SWDB data is merged with 2000 Census data for block groups. Finally, SWDB
data from 2006 through 2010 elections are merged with 20062010 (five-year estimate) ACS
data for census block groups, as is also true for the analyses of Prop. 1A and Prop. 23.
The results of estimating the unrestricted models presented above, using the abovementioned survey and voting data, are presented in Tables 21, 22, and 23. Table 21
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contains the results of the analysis of the survey data, Table 22 shows the results of the
analysis of the voting data for elections taking place between 1992 and 2002, and Table
23 reports the results of the analysis of the voting data for elections taking place between
2006 and 2010. To conserve space, we do not report standard error estimates in any of
these tables, however the statistical significance of the estimates is indicated by asterisks,
as in all the tables of regression results reported above.

Table 21. Linear Probability Models, Survey Data, 1990 and 2004 Elections
Variable

FAVOR_PROP_108

FAVOR_PROP_111

FAVOR_PROP_116

FAVOR_PROP_42

INCOME_L_20

-0.0315

-0.0327

0.0145

0.0561

INCOME_20_40

-0.0720*

-0.0775*

0.0146

0.029

INCOME_60_P

-0.0466

0.0278

0.0641

0.0594

COLLEGE

0.106***

0.116***

BLACK

0.0452

0.097

-0.104

ASIAN

-0.210**

-0.0378

-0.0693

0.00364

HISPANIC

-0.0453

-0.0751

-0.0362

0.0477

YOUNG

0.0501

0.113***

0.0772**

-0.02
0.0733*

0.026

0.0660*
-0.0199

-0.0196

OLD

-0.0154

0.0943*

REP

-0.0892***

-0.0474

-0.150***

-0.0304

HOMEOWN

-0.0459

-0.0614

-0.0524

-0.0619

lnDISTANCE

-0.0256

lnDENSITY

-0.00375

Constant
Observations

0.775***

0.631***

0.664***

0.750***

990

1,075

956

752

R-squared

0.037

0.03

0.045

0.016

Adjusted R-squared

0.0261

0.0195

0.0334

-0.0023

County fixed effects?

No

No

No

No

Notes: Standard errors are not reported in this table.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

Summary statistics for the two surveys used in the analysis reportedin Table 21 are
presented in Appendix B in Tables 24 and 25. We delay interpreting the results in columns
1, 2, and 3 of Tabel 21 for now. In the last column, we analyze Prop. 42 from 2002; a
transportation funding protection proposition. Perhaps due to the small sample size, we
do not find any statistically significant estimates at the 5% level, and as a result not much
is said about this below.
We next present results using voting data in the following two tables.
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-0.0821***
-0.00959***
-0.00319***
0.0003
0.311***
19,724
0.673

0.102***
-0.365***
-0.0546***
-0.0164***
0.00243
0.628***
19,724
0.873

OLD

BUSH/DOLE

HOMEOWN

lnDISTANCE

lnDENSITY

Constant

Observations

Notes: Standard errors are not listed in this table.
p-values are denoted by :
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

County fixed effects?
Yes

19,723

-0.0526***
-0.0260***

-0.0008

YOUNG

Yes

0.0078

0.0129***

0.00835**

HISPANIC

R-squared

0.0578***

0.0679***

0.0224***

OTHER

Yes

0.486***

0.00142

-0.0158***

-0.0219***

-0.345***

0.0138***

0.0394***

0.0374***

0.157***

0.222***

0.0398***

-0.0381***

0.243***

COLLEGE

0.0056

0.234***

0.0260***

0.0922***

INC150

-0.0069
-0.0024

0.107***

0.0315***

0.0248***

INC100

0.0175***

-0.0046

-0.0260***

INC50

0.0166**

BLACK

-0.0003

-0.0130*

INC25

0.0619***

ASIAN

0.0307***

-0.0046

INC0

PCT_181_Y

Using Census 1990 Data
PCT_157_Y

PCT_156_Y

Variable

Yes

0.836

19,724

0.376***

Yes

0.531

21,291

0.518***

0.00114**
-0.00232***

-0.00101***

-0.0316***

-0.157***

-0.0323***

-0.00852*

0.0300***

0.0218***

0.0843***

-0.0987***

-0.0135***

0.0219***

-0.0171*

-0.0136*

-0.0153**

0.0069

Yes

0.738

21,497

0.825***

0.000669***

-0.00461***

-0.0323***

-0.0660***

0.0500***

-0.0042

-0.0319***

-0.0144***

-0.0617***

0.0273***

0.159***

-0.00909*

0.0078

-0.0153***

-0.0338***

-0.0268***

PCT_2_Y

Using Census 2000 Data
PCT_51_Y

-0.0173***

-0.0272***

-0.334***

0.00915*

0.0193***

-0.0122***

-0.0564***

-0.0431***

-0.132***

0.300***

0.0035

-0.0224***

0.0016

0.0455***

0.0835***

PCT_185_Y

Yes

0.77

21,497

0.547***

-0.00239***

-0.00966***

-0.0539***

-0.226***

0.0151***

0.0288***

0.0835***

-0.0297***

0.0371***

0.0022

0.193***

0.0228***

-0.0167**

-0.0156***

-0.0501***

-0.0220***

PCT_7_Y

Table 22. OLS Unrestricted Regressions, Census and Voting Data, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Elections
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0.0489***
0.0474***
-0.0452***
0.0579***
0.000818

-0.00677

0.00664

0.0232***

-0.0193***

-0.0338***

0.0620***

0.00906***

INC_40_60

INC_75_100

INC_100_P

COLLEGE

BLACK

ASIAN

OTHER

-0.0342***
-0.00672***
0.00636***
0.615***
23,017

0.0985***

-0.0179***

0.00178***

0.00310***

0.687***

23,016

0.465

UNEMPLOY

BUSH

HOMEOWN

lnDISTANCE

lnDENSITY

Constant

Observations

R-squared
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Notes: Standard errors are not listed in this table.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

Yes

-0.232***

0.0124***

OLD

County fixed effects?

0.135***
0.0271***

0.0526***

YOUNG

Yes

0.627

0.0972***
-0.0141***

0.0411***

-0.0100***

HISPANIC

-0.00614

-0.00582

0.00353

0.00884

-0.0129***

-0.0125**

INC_20_40

PCT_1B_Y

INC_L_20

PCT_1A_Y

Variable

Yes

0.897

23,016

0.802***

-0.00117***

-0.00725***

-0.0399***

-0.649***

-0.00968*

-0.0357***

0.0141***

-0.0539***

-0.00806**

-0.00251

-0.0969***

0.0933***

-0.0129**

0.0121*

-0.00529

-0.0224***

0.000659

PCT_87_Y

Yes

0.882

23,025

0.709***

0.00268***

-0.00775***

-0.0459***

-0.457***

0.0135***

-0.00812**

0.0374***

0.0272***

0.00364

0.0536***

-0.00628**

0.0565***

-0.00124

-0.000551

0.00322

-0.00333

0.0215***

PCT08_1A_Y

Yes

0.772

23,025

0.373***

0.00375***

0.00368***

-0.0300***

-0.201***

0.0145***

-0.0243***

0.0679***

0.0799***

0.0187***

0.150***

0.0539***

-0.0776***

-0.0140***

-0.00355

-0.00572

0.00399

0.0300***

PCT_10_Y

Yes

0.654

23,015

0.308***

-0.00249***

0.00478***

-0.00346**

0.132***

0.0131***

0.0221***

-0.0225***

0.0589***

0.0126***

0.104***

0.0938***

-0.0858***

0.0241***

-0.00698

-0.0106**

0.00254

0.00133

PCT_91_Y

Yes

0.758

23,033

0.478***

-0.00290***

0.00481***

0.00722***

0.301***

-0.00614

0.00864***

-0.00176

-0.0164***

0.0307***

0.0522***

0.194***

-0.118***

-0.00471

-0.00545

-0.0101*

-0.00635

0.000126

PCT_22_Y

Table 23. OLS Unrestricted Regressions, Census and Voting Data, 2006, 2008 and 2010 Elections

Yes

0.925

23,033

0.153***

-0.00566***

0.00954***

0.00125

0.549***

0.00721

-0.0258***

-0.00255

0.0188***

0.00431

0.0332***

0.0546***

-0.105***

0.0231***

0.000445

-0.0073

0.00147

0.00638

PCT_23_Y
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As previously discussed, Table 17 provides summary statistics for the variables used in
the analysis of the 1990s elections. Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis
of the 1998, 2000, and 2002 elections can be found in Table 26 in Appendix A. Table 22 is
split between propositions 185 and 51 to emphasize that the independent variables in the
analyses are drawn from two different census years. Due to the large number of results
presented in Table 22, we delay interpreting coefficient estimates until the discussion of
broad themes later in this section.
Summary statistics for the independent variables used in the analyses reported in Table 23
are reported in Table 4 (in Chapter I). Due to the large number of results presented in Table
23, we delay discussing results until the discussion of broad themes, to which we now turn.

DISCUSSION: BROAD THEMES IN TRANSPORTATION INITIATIVES
We discuss the results presented in the tables above by dividing them into three time
periods: Early Period (1990-1994), Middle Period (1998-2002) and Recent Period (20062010).

Early Period: 1990-1994
In the case study of Prop. 181 in the previous chapter, we provide some historical context
for the Early Period. As emphasized there, this early time period contains a fascinating
array of propositions, from a transit perspective. For example, although it is conventional
wisdom that the U.S. citizenry detests gasoline taxes, Prop. 111 (June 1990) was
approved by 52.4% of voters, and raised gasoline taxes by nine cents (see summary
in voter information pamphlets in Appendix C). Two other propositions from this election
(Props. 108 and 116) were also approved by voters, paving the way for state bond sales
to improve transportation.
As propositions 108 and 116 were bond propositions to fund rail transit, it may not be
surprising that in Table 21 the coefficient on REP is negative for these propositions.
However, surprisingly, the coefficient on REP for Prop. 111, which proposed a permanent
increase in the gas tax, is not statistically significant. Though still negative, it is smaller in
magnitude than for the other two propositions. This suggests that, at least in the 1990s,
conservative voters were willing to support gas taxes. Prop. 111 promised traffic congestion
relief, and we speculate that conservative voters may have been willing to support it
because the text of the proposition appeared to favor funding of highway construction over
transit infrastructure.
Had data been available, these three propositions would have provided fertile testing
grounds for our Hypotheses 1 through 3.76 Unfortunately, the survey data we found did not
contain geographic identifiers at a sufficiently refined level, such as the census tract level,
or even zip code level, and this prohibited us from generating the variables needed to test
the hypotheses.
A second gas tax proposition was presented to voters in 1990 (Prop. 125). This is the one
proposition in the study period for which we were unable to find any data. This lack of data
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is again unfortunate as our theoretical framework yields clear predictions here – suburban
residents should have opposed this proposition, as it would have raised the cost of driving,
and moreover the proposition proposed using the revenue to fund transit infrastructure.
This proposition was defeated, receiving only 45% of the vote.77
In the November 1992 election, we gathered complete data on two propositions: Prop.
156 and Prop. 157 (coefficient estimate results are shown in Table 22). The first of these
propositions is more interesting from the perspective of our hypotheses,78 as it was the
second of three rail transit bond initiatives. (We analyze the third of these in our Prop.
181 case study above.) Like Prop. 181, Prop. 156 failed. However, looking at the results
in Table 22 for Prop. 156, we find support for Hypothesis 1, as suburban residents were
more likely to vote against it (note the negative coefficient on lnDISTANCE and positive
coefficient on lnDENSITY). This is to say, the results for Prop. 156 and quite similar to
those for Prop. 181.
The final election in this period was the November 1994 election, which presented voters
both Prop. 181 and Prop. 185. The previous chapter discusses both of these in more
detail in the case study of Prop. 181. As described in the preceding paragraph the results
from Prop. 181, like those from Prop. 156, lend support for our Hypothesis 1. One of the
Prop. 185 results is unexpected, namely that the coefficient on lnDENSITY is negative. We
would expect voters in dense neighborhoods to support gas taxes to fund transit, as the
net benefits are often concentrated on these neighborhoods. We would point out that, from
a review of newspaper articles on the propositions, we found that the campaign for Prop.
185 was mired in controversy, and we suspect this or another idiosyncratic aspect of this
proposition may be behind the unexpected finding regarding the sign on lnDENSITY.79 It is
also possible that this controversy – rather than distaste for gas taxes – is the major reason
Prop. 185 garnered such a small percent of the vote (19.5%). Nonetheless, although for
propositions like Prop. 185 we expect the coefficients on lnDENSITY and lnDISTANCE to
have opposite signs, in terms of our Hypothesis 1, the results concerning Prop. 185 lend
at least partial support as the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is negative and significant, and
interestingly is greater in magnitude than any of the lnDISTANCE coefficients presented in
Table 22 for the early 1990s. To put this differently, of all propositions from the early 1990s
in Table 22, suburban residents (measured by distance to downtown) were most opposed
to Prop. 185.

Middle Period: 1998-2002
Four transportation-related propositions were identified from this period. Prop. 7 (1998)
was an environmental proposition with a vehicle emissions component. The other three
propositions from this time period (Props. 2, 42 and 51) were all what we classify as
transportation funding protection propositions. The subsequent decade would see several
more such protection propositions, and we discuss those in greater depth in this section.
But first, we briefly discuss Prop. 7.
Supporters of Prop. 7 claimed it “Uses Private sector tax incentives to reduce toxic
emissions from buses…” Individuals in urban areas should be subject to greater air
pollution, as the greater concentration of vehicles in urban areas magnifies the adverse
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health effects of vehicular pollution. Thus, one might expect that the urban form variables
would be important here. However, and similar to the results for Prop. 185, the coefficient
on lnDENSITY does not confirm this expectation, although the coefficient on lnDISTANCE
does. And again, similar to the case of Prop. 185, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is
greater in magnitude than another of the other propositions we consider from the decade
in which it was decided. Thus, the findings regarding urban form provide mixed support for
Hypothesis 1.
Regarding the transportation funding protection propositions, we must admit that we were
not able to become as familiar with this class of propositions as we were with many others.
At the same time, we suspect that voters may also not be very familiar with these types
of propositions. As a result, our hypotheses tests here are more speculative and we offer
them with the hope that our thinking may aid readers of this report who are interested in
the transportation funding protection phenomenon. Given the large number of propositions
that fall into this category, it would seem this is an area deserving of future attention.
The basic premise behind these funding protection propositions was to make sure taxes
that people paid at the pump were to go to transportation purposes and not be siphonedoff to the general fund. For this 1998-2002 period, we have voting data for two of these
protection propositions, Prop. 2 and Prop. 51. We also have survey data for one: Prop.
42. As mentioned briefly in the paragraph following Table 21, the survey data does not
yield any significant estimates, and so here we focus on the results from the voting data.
One aspect of this class of transportation funding protection propositions is that they are
heterogeneous. As evidence, we note that Prop. 51 was endorsed by the California Transit
Association (a pro-transit organization), while Prop. 2 was endorsed by the California
Taxpayer Association (a fiscally conservative organization). While the coefficients on the
DOLE variable (our proxy for ideology from this time period) are negative for both Props. 2
and 51, it is greater in magnitude for Prop. 51, which was endorsed by the transit association.
Given what seems to be the transit focus of Prop. 51, one might expect suburban residents
to be opposed to Prop. 51, but the coefficient estimates on lnDISTANCE and lnDENSITY
(which are positive and negative, respectively) are contrary to this expectation.
We conclude this discussion of transportation funding protection propositions in 1998-2002
period by reiterating that more work is needed to better understand voter preferences for
this class of propositions. Our results do not yield consistent findings here.

Recent Period: 2006-2010
Like the Early Period (1990-1994), the Recent Period (2006-2010) offers some fascinating
propositions to analyze, some that will dramatically shape the future of transit for years to
come. These include Prop. 1A and Prop. 23, discussed in detail as case studies in Chapter II.
This Recent Period (refer to Table 23) presents the continuation of the transportation
funding protection movement, with Props 1A (from 2006), 91 and 22. Finally, a few other
propositions are of interest. Prop. 87 was a proposed gas tax, but on producers. Two bond
acts (Props. 10 and 1B) include environmental components.
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We begin with the protection propositions. First, we can dispense with discussing Prop.
91, as its supporters eventually encouraged voters to vote “no,” arguing Prop. 91 was
no longer needed (see the information on Prop. 91 presented in Appendix C). This sort
of idiosyncrasy makes this proposition a poor candidate for analysis to draw out broad
themes.
Of the remaining two propositions (Prop. 1A (2006) and Prop. 22), we see that suburban
voters supported these, as seen by the positive coefficient on lnDISTANCE.80 Conservative
voters also supported these, especially Prop. 22, which can be seen by the positive
coefficient on BUSH.
Turning to Prop. 87, a gas tax on oil producers, we think our hypotheses might apply
here. Although supporters of this proposition argued that Prop. 87, “makes it illegal [for
oil companies] to pass the cost to consumers,”81 our knowledge of tax incidence theory
suggests to us that gasoline consumers would end up paying higher prices, and many of
them would come to this conclusion on their own. Indeed, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE
is negative. This coefficient estimate is greater in magnitude than any other lnDISTANCE
coefficient during this period except for Prop. 1A (2008) and Prop. 23.
Proposition 10 proposed $5 billion in bond sales for alternative fuel vehicles. It is not clear
that the net benefits of this policy vary spatially, but it is possible that they are concentrated
on suburban voters who drive more. It is also possible that they are concentrated on
dense neighborhoods, which suffer from higher levels of air pollution. Prop. 1B was a
transportation bond. The text of the proposition indicates the funds would be used to
support both roads and transit. Thus, like Prop. 10, it is not clear that our hypotheses apply
to these propositions, and it is not clear that the net benefits vary spatially.
The results in Table 23 suggest that voters perceived the net benefits of Prop. 1B as
falling on urbanites, as the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is negative, and the coefficient on
lnDENSITY is positive. However, for Prop. 10, the coefficient on lnDISTANCE is positive,
indicating the net benefits could fall on suburbanites, but the coefficient on lnDENSITY is
negative, suggesting voters might not see the net benefits of Prop. 10 as varying spatially.
In discussing the results in this section, we have not addressed the estimates on any of the
socio-economic or demographic variables. We leave it to the interested reader to consult
Tables 21-23. Whatever the shortcomings of a statistical approach like the one we have
taken in this report, one of its virtues is that it enables conveying a large amount of data
without requiring a large number of words.
This concludes our discussion of broad themes across the propositions. The major lesson
we take away from the analysis presented in this section is that, although this report
focuses on transportation-related propositions, the 20 propositions we selected for study
in fact represent a broad range of issues, and thus, it is not easy to identify broad lessons.
Further identification of broad trends is left as a task for future research.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Direct legislation offers researchers a type of laboratory for studying the preferences of
voters on various issues. Over the last 20 years, Californians have voted on many transitrelated issues. We have estimated regressions to test a variety of hypotheses related to
the role of access and capitalization effects in determining voting patterns. Economics
logic predicts that a voter is more likely to support a transit investment if she is more likely
to use it (the access effect) and if the voter is a homeowner who believes that her property
will appreciate in value because of the home’s proximity to an increasingly valuable piece
of transport infrastructure (the capitalization effect).
In this report, we have presented evidence supporting both of these hypotheses. Throughout
this report, we have been careful to consider other relevant factors, such as residential
ideological sorting, such that liberals tend to live in the center city and conservatives tend
to live in the suburbs.
Our evidence of an access effect and a capitalization effect suggests that there will
be consequences of the median voter living further and further from city centers. As
employment suburbanizes, this trend predicts that, all else equal, support for public transit
projects will decline.
While we have presented some results using survey-level micro data, most of our
regressions have been based on data featuring the census block as the unit of analysis.
While we recognize the concern with ecological regressions, we believe that it is important
to note that, with our focus on distance, our study’s findings are less sensitive to standard
ecological regression critiques than the typical paper. At no point in this paper did we state
a hypothesis related to interactions of share variables, such as conjecturing that minority
households who are homeowners are more likely to support public transit. This type of
interaction cannot be tested using aggregate data. Instead, our focus was the distance to the
CBD and public transit infrastructure gradients. In testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 we examined
the interaction of a census block’s share of homeowners and distance to the infrastructure,
but this interaction does not suffer from an ecological regression critique because there is
no variation in “distance to the transit infrastructure” for any two homeowners in the same
census block. Instead, the variation that allowed us to estimate this interaction term was
based on observing different communities with the same homeownership share that were
different distances to the public transit infrastructure.
Turning to the implications of our results for policy, to us the most obvious implication
is that encouraging urban living will cause support for transit to increase. To some, this
conclusion may be obvious. However, this conclusion is not obvious to everyone, and our
empirical findings provide estimates of the magnitude by which reversing suburbanization
will increase political support for transit.
Previous research, including some we have produced, has documented that urban
residents are more likely to use transit and also have smaller carbon footprints than
suburban residents. Therefore, a policy that encourages urban living has the direct effect
of increasing transit use and diminishing harmful environmental impacts. However, in this
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report we provided evidence that such a policy will also increase political support for transit;
thus, successful pro-urban policies not only have the immediate effect of increasing transit
use and lowering carbon emissions, but over time such policies will lead to better urban
infrastructure, which is likely to further encourage urban living.
How can policy makers encourage urban living? We did not address this question in this
report. However, based on our knowledge of the literature and previous research, we offer
the following ideas. Providing more systematic answers to this question should be the
focus of future research.
Policy makers at the local level are perhaps most important. We have three main
suggestions for local policy makers. First, land use regulations that raise the price of
urban housing should be seriously reconsidered. We recognize that there are some valid
reasons, including aesthetic concerns, for limiting the height of buildings and the density
of neighborhoods. Likewise, taxing developers to provide affordable housing is certainly a
well-intentioned policy. However, our impression is that in many cases in California, these
regulations have had the effect of raising the cost of urban housing and reducing social
welfare. Thus, all land use regulations should be subject to scrutiny, no matter how well
intentioned. Some of these regulations will pass the cost-benefit test, but others will not.
Second, local policy makers should work to improve schools. Many households leave
cities in search of better schools, which they believe can be found in suburbs. Third, many
households leave cities in search of the safety of suburbs, and local policy makers should
work to improve safety.
Of course there are no magic bullets for improving schools or reducing crime, and we are
agnostic about which tactics are most likely to achieve these objectives. For example,
both “liberal” polices, such as increasing state-level involvement in education, and
“conservative” policies, such as encouraging charter schools, have merit. Likewise, both
community policing and data-driven approaches to patrolling both have their supporters
and opponents, but we believe there are situations where both tactics are likely to succeed.
In short, we encourage local policy makers to be creative and open-minded in their
approaches to schools and policing, as these public services are critical to encouraging
urban living.
State-level policy makers should try to support cities in the three areas mentioned above.
The purpose of legislation like California Senate Bill 375 (2008), is to encourage cities and
metropolitan planning organizations to better integrate land use and transportation plans.
More polices along these lines would be welcome. Perhaps other state-level polices could
be devised to help ensure that wasteful local-level land use regulations can be avoided. It
is possible that state policy could also improve policing and schooling. More research in
this area is needed.
At the federal level, certain anti-urban policies, such as the home mortgage interest
deduction, have the effect of encouraging suburbanization. The above-mentioned
local, state and federal policy recommendations have been put forward by other urban
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economists.82 Our twist on these recommendations is that encouraging households to live
in central cities will increase political support for transit.
Another finding of our study is that homeowners near transit infrastructure are more likely
to support public transit, and this suggests that these individuals gain a larger share of
the benefits of these projects. Should such findings bolster the case for these individuals
paying a larger share of such projects?
We are not convinced that the answer to the above question is “yes.” However, we do think
that policy makers should pay more attention to land market effects when drafting policies.
This also applies when writing propositions. For example, one possible reason Prop. 111,
the gas tax proposition from 1990, passed is that it bundled a gas tax, the incidence of
which falls most heavily on suburban voters who drive more, with spending on road and
highway infrastructure, the benefits of which fall on these same suburban voters.
Thus one non-obvious lesson from this study is that future propositions to fund transit
might be bundled with policies that will benefit suburban voters. Of course, every politician
is aware of the utility of bundling policies to enable compromise solutions. However, we
would guess that most policy makers do not consider how seemingly unrelated policies,
such as AB 32 or gas taxes, can have effects on land markets that vary spatially. Thus, one
nuanced recommendation from our study is that policy makers should pay more attention
to how transportation policies impact land values. For many households, their home is
their single largest financial asset, and whether consciously or not, homeowners often
behave – and vote – in ways consistent with maximizing the value of their home.
Finally, not only can taking land-market impacts into account help increase support for
transit policies, it can also help finance transit projects. A recent report by San Francisco
Planning and Urban Research Association (SPUR)83 estimates that in the case of HSR,
land value capture techniques may yield revenues at $0.406 billion. This is far lower than
other categories considered, including $15.84 billion in gas tax revenue, $9.42 billion in
road tolls, $3.75 billion in vehicle license fees, and regional general obligation bonds (for
San Francisco and Los Angeles) of $1 billion. The final alternative funding source the
SPUR report identifies is money from the state’s cap and trade program. They estimate
this amount at $13.05 billion.84
We feel that value capture revenue can potentially be higher than estimated by SPUR.
Unfortunately, very little is known about the magnitude by which land values rise as a
result of various policies. Therefore, we suggest future research try to determine the extent
to which these policies affect land values. An enhanced ability to determine which areas
will see land values rise and fall is the key to creatively leveraging value capture to finance
transit.
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES AND CODING TECHNIQUES
In this data appendix we outline all the data sources used in this study. We discuss coding
techniques used to match various data sources, and we present summary statistics for
datasets used in the text but for which we did not have space to show.

DATA BIBLIOGRAPHY
Statewide Database (SWDB). This is the source for voting data. http://statewidedatabase.
org (Accessed March 15, 2013). Data used in this study was downloaded under the pages
titled, “2001 Redistricting Data: 1992 - 2000 Election Census Block Data,” and “2011
Redistricting Data: 2002 - 2010 Election Census Block Data.”
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). This is the
source for 1990 and 2000 Census data at the block group level. http://icpsr.umich.edu/
(Accessed March 15, 2013). Specifically, the data comes from the two studies listed below:
• U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Census of Population and Housing,
1990 [United States]: Summary Tape File 3A. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census [producer], 1992. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999-12-29. doi:10.3886/
ICPSR09782.v1
• U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Bureau of the Census, and Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research. Census of Population and Housing, 2000 [United
States]: Block Group Subset From Summary File 3. ICPSR13576-v1. Ann Arbor,
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2004.
doi:10.3886/ICPSR13576.v1
Social Explorer. This is the source for American Community Survey (ACS) data, five-year
estimates (2006-2010) at the block group level. https://www.socialexplorer.com/ (Accessed
March 15, 2013).
U.S. Census. This is the source for ACS Employment Status Data by Block Group, 2006—
2010. This was not contained in the Social Explorer files. We obtained it at the following
web address: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/laborfor/acs_employ.html (Accessed
March 15, 2013).
U.S. Census. This is the source for MSA definitions used in variable calculations.
Throughout this report we use the 2006 definitions. http://www.census.gov/population/
metro/ (Accessed March 15, 2013).
Neighborhood Change Database. This is the source for the data used in Figures 1 and
2 and in Table 1. Essentially, this database provides historical population data for US
Census tracts, using the 2000 tract boundaries. For more information, see http://www.
urban.org/publications/900555.html (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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UC Data. This is the source for Field Poll survey data. This study reports on analysis from
the second 1990 survey and the fourth 2002 survey. http://ucdata.berkeley.edu/ (Accessed
March 15, 2013).
PPIC. This is our other source for survey data. We analyzed data from the 2010 PPIC
Statewide Survey from July 2010. The topic of this survey was “Californians and the
Environment.” http://www.ppic.org/content/data/2010_July.zip (Accessed May 30, 2013).

CODING TECHNIQUE DISCUSSION
This section discusses coding techniques we use to allocate block group voting and
census data across time periods. Census block groups from two periods do not necessarily
have the same geographic boundaries; this is problematic when merging the census
demographic data from 1990 with the election results from 1992 or 1994 that are only
available by the Census 2000’s block group geographic boundaries. So, to establish
a block group equivalency from year 2000 back to1990 and generate weighted voting
results, a method of allocation based on land area is used for block groups that do not
have matching geographic boundaries. For this allocation, we must make the assumption
that persons are uniformly distributed in each geographic area (block group).
This method requires the use of a geographic information system (GIS) and the Census
TIGER/Line Shapefiles (spatial data) of all block groups for Census 1990, 2000 and 2010,
which are publicly available from the Census site85 or alternatively from ESRI’s site.86
The Shapefile contains the FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards codes) and
geographic information of each block group, which can be used to calculate the areas
needed for the allocation.
First, 1992 voting results at the block group level are merged with the 2000 spatial data,
based on the unique FIPS number of each block group, and then the area of each of the
year 2000 block groups is calculated. Next, the 2000 block group Shapefile with the merged
data is overlaid onto the 1990 block group Shapefile in order to establish a 2000-to-1990
relationship data; the new shapes are created where the block group boundaries from the
two layers cross and/or overlap each other. The new spatial data contain all the possible
relationships between the two periods (although the census87 provides a relationship file
for each of the two periods, it does not have the land area values needed for calculations,
and it requires extra steps in order to merge the voting data).
Finally, from this new spatial data, the individual land areas are calculated and divided by
the corresponding year 2000 land areas in order to calculate the percentage of the 2000
land area that is contained in each 1990 block group. For example, if the year 2000 block
group is exactly the same as that of 1990, or the entire block group is contained in a 1990
block group, the assigned weight is 1. However, if two or more block groups merged from
1990 or are divided, the assigned weight is less than 1. These new weights are multiplied
by the merged voting results from previous steps, and then, all these multiple relationships
are collapsed by their FIPS numbers, which gives us the weighted voting results. The
same process is utilized for allocating the 1994 voting results. For allocating the 2002
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election results with the Census 2000, the 2010 Shapefile88 is merged with 2002 voting
data, and then weights calculated in the same way.

TABLES OF SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table 24. Summary Statistics, 1990 Field Poll Survey Data
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

FAVOR_PR_108

1,017

0.71

0.45

0

1

FAVOR_PR_111

1,112

0.59

0.49

0

1

FAVOR_PR_116

989

0.66

0.48

0

1

INCOME_L_20

1,265

0.18

0.38

0

1

INCOME_20_40

1,265

0.34

0.47

0

1

INCOME_60_P

1,265

0.23

0.42

0

1

COLLEGE

1,309

0.34

0.47

0

1

BLACK

1,309

0.04

0.18

0

1

ASIAN

1,309

0.03

0.17

0

1

HISPANIC

1,309

0.08

0.28

0

1

YOUNG

1,309

0.29

0.46

0

1

OLD

1,309

0.18

0.39

0

1

REP

1,309

0.34

0.48

0

1

HOMEOWN

1,286

0.70

0.46

0

1

Source: The California Poll (also known as The Field Poll), number 90-02, May, 1990.

Table 25. Summary Statistics, 2002 Field Poll Survey Data
Variable
FAVOR_PROP_42
INCOME_L_20

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

797

0.66

0.47

0

1

1,019

0.13

0.34

0

1

INCOME_20_40

1,019

0.21

0.41

0

1

INCOME_60_P

1,019

0.40

0.49

0

1

INCOME_ REFUSED

1,019

0.06

0.24

0

1

COLLEGE

1,019

0.44

0.50

0

1

BLACK

1,019

0.08

0.27

0

1

ASIAN

1,019

0.05

0.21

0

1

HISPANIC

1,019

0.16

0.37

0

1

YOUNG

1,019

0.23

0.42

0

1

OLD

1,019

0.20

0.40

0

1

REP

1,019

0.40

0.49

0

1

HOMEOWN

1,019

0.68

0.47

0

1

lnDISTANCE

925

2.93

0.83

0.27

6.61

lnDENSITY

977

7.61

1.69

1.42

10.82

Source: The California Poll (also known as The Field Poll), number 02-04, September, 2002.
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Table 26. Summary Statistics, 2000 Census and Voting Data
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

PCT_7_Y

21,970

0.45

0.09

0

1

PCT_51_Y

21,805

0.42

0.08

0

1

PCT_2_Y

21,971

0.74

0.07

0.25

1

PCT_BUSH

22,063

0.39

0.18

0

1

INC_0_25

21,965

1.26

0.17

1

2

INC_25_50

21,965

0.27

0.11

0

1

INC_50_75

21,965

0.19

0.08

0

1

INC_100_150

21,965

0.10

0.09

0

1

INC_150_P

21,965

0.07

0.10

0

1

COLLEGE

21,999

0.26

0.20

0

1

BLACK

22,007

0.06

0.13

0

1

ASIAN

22,007

0.10

0.13

0

1

OTHER

22,007

0.22

0.18

0

1

HISP

22,007

0.30

0.27

0

1

YOUNG

22,006

0.32

0.13

0

1

OLD

22,006

0.15

0.10

0

1

DOLE

21,663

0.38

0.19

0

1

HOMEOWN

21,966

0.59

0.27

0

1

lnDISTANCE

22,163

2.88

0.87

0

4.39

lnDENSITY

22,066

6.47

1.80

2.77

Sources: Census of Population and Housing, 2000, and Statewide Database (SWDB), multiple years.
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AGE_18_34

HISPANIC

OTHER

ASIAN

BLACK

COLLEGE

INC_100_P

INC_80_100

INC_40_60

-0.0544***
(0.0177)

(0.0773)

0.123
(0.1420)

0.226

(0.6210)

-0.195**

0.0107

(0.1430)

(0.6240)
(0.0227)

0.0269

(0.0993)

(0.1420)

(0.6210)

-0.284

-0.205**

0.121

0.0876
(0.1410)

-0.0756

(0.6160)

0.0999

(0.0262)

(0.1140)

(0.0217)

-0.0233

(0.1740)

-0.234

(0.0279)

-0.00354

(0.1750)

-0.292*

(0.1740)

-0.257

(0.1730)

-0.303*

(0.0321)

-0.0135

(0.0372)

(0.0304)
-0.0920***

(0.1330)

-0.276**

-0.0596

(0.0257)

-0.0960***

(0.2070)

-0.295

(0.0330)

-0.0967***

(0.2080)

-0.304

(0.2070)

-0.23

(0.2050)

-0.337

(0.0381)

-0.0301

(0.0442)

0.0177

0.0547
(0.0409)

-0.0389
(0.0345)

(0.0406)

-0.0734**

(0.0281)

(0.1230)

-0.0425

(0.0258)

0.0194

(0.2070)

0.469**

(0.0331)

-0.0842**

(0.2080)

0.246

(0.2070)

0.319

(0.2050)

0.383*

(0.0382)

-0.0666*

(0.0442)

-0.0549

(0.0409)

0.00636

(0.0407)

-0.0760*

(0.0449)

(0.0448)

(0.0342)

0.00679

“Wait to
Address GHG”
AGREE_WAIT

-0.00929

“Oppose State Action
on Global Warming”
OPPOSE_CA_
ACTION

-0.108***

(0.0378)

-0.143***

“Oppose AB 32”
OPPOSE_AB32

-0.19

-0.0903***

-0.087

-0.158***
(0.0279)

(0.1220)

(0.1350)

INC_L_20

-0.489***

(0.0308)

-0.374***

Variable

INC_20_40

-0.105***

Summary Variable
PROP23INDEX

“Global Warming
Not a Threat”
NOT_SERIOUS_
THREAT

Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable, Unrestricted

(0.0214)

-0.0407*

(0.1720)

0.163

(0.0275)

-0.0313

(0.1730)

0.0396

(0.1720)

0.147

(0.1710)

0.0937

(0.0317)

-0.0742**

(0.0368)

-0.0202

(0.0340)

-0.0189

(0.0338)

-0.105***

(0.0373)

-0.124***

“Oppose
Regulating GHG”
OPPOSE_REGULATE

Table 27. OLS and Linear Probability Models, Survey Data, 2010; Attitudes Towards Climate Change Policy

The table below presents further results from the PPIC Prop. 23 survey from 2010, by looking at the index components.
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Notes: Standard error is listed in parentheses.
p-values are denoted by:
*** p<0.01
** p<0.05
* p<0.10

1,937
0.178

(0.2160)

1,937

(0.1760)

(0.7680)

0.705***

(0.0222)

-0.0396*

(0.0100)

-0.0174*

0.246

0.237

2.186***

1,937

(0.0181)

(0.0792)

0.238

0.0297

-0.0896

Adjusted R-squared

-0.0123
(0.0081)

-0.0867**

(0.0355)

-0.00804
(0.0155)

(0.0219)

0.0119

(0.0178)

(0.0779)

0.0691

1,937

(0.2560)

0.133

1,937

(0.2560)

0.239

(0.0264)

(0.0264)
0.573**

-0.0248

(0.0118)

-0.0389***

(0.0184)

0.143

1,937

(0.2130)

0.433**

(0.0219)

-0.0256

(0.0099)

-0.0195**

(0.0153)

-0.0107

(0.0216)

(0.0260)
-0.0136

0.270***

(0.0357)

-0.0102

(0.0279)

0.0261

“Oppose
Regulating GHG”
OPPOSE_REGULATE

0.283***

(0.0430)

0.0385

(0.0335)

0.0495

“Wait to
Address GHG”
AGREE_WAIT

-0.0294

(0.0118)

0.0013

(0.0184)

0.0480***

(0.0259)

0.167***

(0.0429)

0.325***

(0.0362)

(0.0126)

0.308***

1.352***

0.0276

(0.0295)

(0.1290)

-0.0276

(0.0335)

0.00698

“Oppose State Action
on Global Warming”
OPPOSE_CA_
ACTION

0.0173

(0.0282)

0.0435

“Oppose AB 32”
OPPOSE_AB32

(0.0551)

-0.00638

0.0116

Observations

Constant

HOMEOWNER

lnZIPDEN

lnDISTANCE

REP

UNEMPLOY

-0.00359
(0.0230)

AGE_65P

0.123

Variable

(0.1010)

Summary Variable
PROP23INDEX

“Global Warming
Not a Threat”
NOT_SERIOUS_
THREAT

Estimated Coefficients by OLS on Dependent Variable, Unrestricted
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APPENDIX C: EXCERPTS FROM VOTER INFORMATION
PAMPHLETS
Below we reproduce information from the official voter information pamphlets. These are
the pamphlets produced by the Secretary of State and distributed to the public prior to
elections. The University of California (Hastings College of the Law) Law Library maintains
an archive of pamphlets from elections going back to 1911. We have modified the
formatting of the information from these pamphlets to achieve consistency in formatting
across elections.
PROP 108: Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1990.
This act provides for a bond issue of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) to provide funds for acquisition of rights-ofway, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, and rail transit programs.
Appropriates money from state General Fund to pay off bonds. Fiscal Impact: If all authorized bonds are sold at 7.5
percent and paid over the typical 20 year period, the General Fund will incur about $1.8 billion to pay off bond
principal ($1 billion) and interest ($790 million). The estimated annual cost of bond principal and interest is $90
million.
This measure authorized the state to sell $1 billion in general obligation bonds to provide funds for rail capital outlay.
This authorization, however, would only take effect if voters approve proposition 111, The Traffic Congestion Relief
and Spending Limitation Act of 1990. General obligation bonds are backed by the state, meaning that the state is
obligated to pay the principal and interest cost on these bonds. General Fund revenues would be used to pay these
costs. These revenues come primarily from the state corporate and personal income taxes and the state sales tax.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Rail transit will remove thousands of automobiles from
congested streets and highways, it will speed
workers to and from their jobs and homes safely and
it will reduce the dangerous pollution of the air we
breathe. Rail transit is the key to a better
transportation future and proposition 108, the
Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act, will move
California into a new era of rail transit.

Our opposition to this measure is not based on the
worthiness of the projects which would funded, but on
the wisdom of increasing California’s debt burden any
further. Last year California sold more general obligation
bonds than any year in its history--$1.6 billion. Thomas
Hayes, State Treasurer, anticipates sales of general
obligation bonds in excess of $2 billion this year.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf (accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 111: The Traffic Congestion Relief and Spending Limitation Act of 1990.
This measure would enact a statewide traffic congestion relief program and update the spending limit on
state and local government to better reflect the needs of a growing California population. It would
provide new revenues to be used to reduce traffic congestion by building state highways, local streets,
and roads, and public mass transit facilities. This measure enact a 55% increase in truck weight fees and
a five-cent-per-gallon increase in the fuel tax on August 1, 1990, and an additional one cent on January
1 of each of the next four years.
This measure makes changes in how the appropriations limit operates and in how the minimum funding
guarantee for public schools and community colleges is determined. Passage of this measure also would
cause several changes in laws relating to transportation funding to take effect.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Proposition 111’s innovative transportation
package will spend 18.5 billion over the next 10
years to make our freeways, bridges and streets
earthquake safe, complete highway and mass
transit projects already authorized but not funded,
fix potholes and increase maintenance of local
streets and highways, reduce peak-hour traffic
by expanding van, carpool and staggered work
hour programs, expand local rail transit systems,
improve traffic flow, improve state highways, and
reduce air pollution.

This proposition is a tax increase, pure and
simple. It would raise your gas tax by 9 cents per
gallon, raise sales taxes, taxes on trucks, and
pave the way for #3 billion more of bonded
indebtedness. Over the next ten years, these
new taxes would total $18.5 billion or more than
$600 per man, woman and child in California.
For family of our, this $2,400!

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).

PROP 116: Rail Transportation. Bond Act. Initiative Statute. 1990.
Authorizes general obligation bond issue of $1,990,000,000 to provide funds principally for passenger and
commuter rail systems, with limited funds available for public mass transit guideways, paratransit vehicles, bicycle
and ferry facilities, and railroad technology museum. Allocates certain amounts to specified state and local
entities through a grant program administered by the California Transportation Commission. Program will require
some matching funds from local entities. Appropriates money from state General Fund to pay off bonds. Fiscal
Impact: If all authorized bonds are sold at 7.5 percent interest and paid over the typical 20-year period, the General
Fund will incur about $3.6 billion in cost to pay off bond principal ($2 billion) and interest ($1.6 billion). The estimated
annual cost of bond principal and interest is $180 million.
This measure authorized the state to sell $1.99 billion general obligation bonds to provide funds mostly for rail
capital outlay. General obligation bonds are backed by the state, meaning that the state is obligated to pay the
principal and interest cost on these bonds. General Fund revenues would be used to pay these costs. These
revenues come primarily from the state corporate and personal income taxes and the state sales tax.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

A Yes vote on Proposition 116 will reduce traffic congestion, help improve air quality, conserve energy, and
protect the environment for you and your family.

This $1.99 billion Clean Air Act will neither clean the
air or improve transportation. It will take money from
badly needed programs including education, health
care, child care, worthwhile transportation projects,
and any other item in the State budget. Even More tax
money will be needed to fund high operating costs of
the trains.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 125: Motor Vehicle Fuels Tax. Rail Transit Funding. Legislative
Constitutional Amendment. 1990.
This measure would amend the Constitution to authorize expenditures from the revenues raised from
state-imposed taxes on motor vehicle fuels and fees upon the operation and use of vehicles for the
acquisition of rail transit vehicle and rail transit equipment which operate only on exclusive public mass
transit guideways. Fiscal Impact: An unknown amount of revenues raised from the state-imposed taxes
on motor vehicle fuels and fees upon the operation and use of vehicles may be shifted from existing
uses for the purchase of rail transit. The extent of the shift depends upon the number of counties or
geographic areas that approve and use these revenues for the specified purposes.
This constitutional amendment allows Article XIX revenues to be used for the acquisition of rail transit
vehicles and rail transit guideways. These uses must first be approved by a majority of the voters in the
county or geographic area where the revenues are to be spent.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Proposition 125 improves rail transit without
increasing taxes one cent. It allows a portion of the
existing state gas tax, which is already allocated by
law for mass transit capital improvements, to also
be used to acquire rail transit rolling stock, such
as light rail cars, rapid transit cars, and commuter/
intercity rail cars and locomotives.

Proposition 125 requires that taxes be taken
from one class of citizens—automobile and truck
drivers—to benefit another class of citizens—the
riders of mass rail transit, who not only pay no
taxes for this benefit, but ride on the backs of
those who must use gasoline-powered vehicles
for their private and business transportation.
Prop. 125 dictates that the cost of driving an
automobile or truck be fixed artificially higher—so
that the cost of using a mass rail transit system
can be priced artificially lower.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).

PROP 156: Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1992. Bond Act.
This Act provides for a bond issue of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) to provide funds for acquisition
of rights-of-ways, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail,
and rail transit programs.
This measure allows the state to sell $1 billion in general obligation bonds to provide fund for rail capital
outlay. General obligation bonds are backed by the state, meaning that the state is required to pay the
principal and interest costs on these bonds. General Fund revenues would be used to pay these costs.
General Fund revenues come primarily from the state personal and corporate income taxes and the
state sales and use tax.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Prop. 156 will improve and extend rail transit
projects throughout California where needed most.
Proposition 156 will provide jobs for California
workers, alternatives to overcrowded freeways,
and help people safely and efficiently. Better rail
transit means fewer cars on the road, less gridlock
and cleaner air. YES on 156!

Rail transit is so expensive this measure will
finance few facilities. There are other
transportation programs which provide much
more benefit for fare lower costs. This measure
will add to our budget problems. Nearly half of
the rail bonds authorized by previous bond
measures have still not been issued.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1992g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 157: Toll Roads and Highways. Legislative Constitutional Amendment.
1992.
Provides that any toll road or toll highway owned by the state and leased to a private entity shall be
permanently toll free upon the expiration of the lease or after tolls have been collected for a total of 35
years, whichever occurs first. Legislature may suspend the application of the foregoing provision to any
toll roads or toll highways by a statue passed in each house by a two-thirds vote of membership. Fiscal
Impact: This measure would result in the potential loss of a revenue source for highway maintenance
and operations, beginning no earlier than the year 2030. Potential loss could be tens of millions of dollar
annually.
This Constitutional amendment band the collection of tolls on any road or highway owned by the state
and leased to private entity after tolls have been collected for 35 years or upon expiration of lease
(whichever occurs first). However, the Legislature could suspend the band with a two-thirds vote of each
house. Absent a suspension, the state would no longer have the option of continuing toll collection on
the four projects underway or any similar future projects after the leases expire or after toll have been
collected for 35 years.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Prop. 157 will take tolls off private toll roads when
they are turned over to the state. We already pay
taxes for the right to drive on our freeways. We
shouldn’t have to pay expensive tolls also. Keep
freeways free! Stop the tolls!

Prop 157 will lead to higher taxes. It will bail
out speculators and bankers who want to build
private highways to allow massive land
developments. This measure would, after 35
years, turn over to public worn out highways.
Taxpayers will have to pay billions to repair them.
Vote NO!

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1992g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).

PROP 181: Passenger Rail and Clean Air Bond Act of 1994.
This act provides for a bond issue of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) to provide funds for acquisition
of rights-of-way, capital expenditures, and acquisitions of rolling stock for intercity rail, commuter rail, and
rail transit program. Authorizes third of three bond issues of one billion dollars each, provided for by
Statutes of 1989, Chapter 108, to finance total of three billion dollars for the long-range transportation
plan. Voters approved the first issue in 1990, rejected the second issue in 1992.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The State
would be authorized to issue $1 billion in general
obligation bonds to construct rail lines and related
facilities and to acquire rights-of-way, rail cars, and
locomotives.

A NO vote on this measure means: The State
would not be authorized to issue $1 billion in
general obligation bonds to construct rail lines
and related facilities and to acquire rights-of-way,
rail cars, and locomotives.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

A Yes vote on Proposition 181 will:
• Expand rail service throughout California
• Reduce traffic congestion
• Improve air quality
• Help stimulate California’s economy
This isn’t a new tax. Rather it authorizes the sale
of $1 billion in state bonds to improve and expand
intercity, commuter and urban rail system in
California.

This is a billion dollar boondoggle that even the
measure’s author, Assemblyman Jim Costa,
agrees should not be on the ballot. Taxpayers
shouldn’t pay for more rail projects—current
ridership still lags behind capacity. Voters
rejected red ink-generating bond measures in
June. They should do it again.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 185: Public Transportation Trust Fund, Gasoline Sales Tax. Initiative
Statute. 1994.
Provides for an additional 4% tax on gasoline sales. Revenues for electric rail and clean fuel buses, light
rail, commuter and intercity rail system, and other transportation-related programs, including wetlands,
riparian habitat and parks. Fiscal Impact: Increased gasoline sales tax revenues of about $360 million
annually. Multimillion dollar annual increases in state and local costs for mass transportation services,
potentially offset by unknown amount of revenues.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The State
would raise the sales tax on gasoline by 4 percent
and use the resulting revenues to pay for (1)
capital and operating improvements to passenger
rail and mass transit bus services and (2) safety
and operating improvements to streets and
highways.

A NO vote on this measure means: The State
would not raise the sales tax on gasoline to pay
for 1) capital and operating improvements to
passenger rail and mass transit bus services and
(2) safety and operating improvements to streets
and highways.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Slash transportation waste and bureaucracy.
Stop the Legislature from raiding transportation
funds. Develop electric and clean fuel bus and rail
system. Clean our air and save energy. Make road
and bridges earthquake-safe. Provide transit for
disabled and senior citizens. Restart California’s
economy. Create jobs. Vote YES on 185.

Another TAX INCREASE! A $700 million annual
SALES TAX INCREASE on gasoline. 185 is
double taxation! 185 also creates an ALLPOWERFUL, Sacramento COMMITTEE of
three POLITICAL APPOINTEES with the sole
AUTHORITY to spend billions of our taxpayers
dollars. Our taxes already are TOO HIGH. VOTE
NO on 185.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).

PROP 2: Transportation Funding. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 1998.
Imposes repayment conditions on loans of transportation revenues to the General Fund and local
entities. Designates local transportation funds as trust funds and requires a transportation purpose for
their use. Fiscal Impact: Not likely to have any fiscal impact on state and local governments.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: Additional
restrictions would be placed on loans of state
transportation funds to the state General Fund. In
addition, local transportation funds from on-quarter
cent of county sales tax could not be diverted from
specified transportation purposes.

A NO vote on this measure means: Loans could
continue to be made from state transportation
funds to the General Fund without added
restrictions. Local transportation funds derived
from the on-quarter cent of county sales tax
could be diverted for non-transportation
purposes by changing state law.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Proposition 2 will make sure the money you pay in
fuel taxes is used to build and maintain
California’s roads and transit systems. Without
paying 1C more at the pump, you can help
improve transportation by joining with the
California Taxpayers Association, business, labor,
and environmental organizations in voting “yes.”

Not Provided

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 7: Air Quality Improvement Tax Credit. Initiative Statute. 1998.
Authorizes $218 million in state sale tax credits annually, until January 2011, to encourage air-emissions
reductions through the acquisition, conversion, and retrofitting of vehicles and equipment. Fiscal Impact:
Annual State revenue loss averaging tens of millions to over a hundred million dollars, to beyond 2010.
Annually, through 2010-11: state cost of about $4.7 million; additional local revenues, potentially in the
millions of dollars. Potential unknown long-term savings.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The state
Air Resources Board would administer a new tax
credit program. Tax credits would be awarded
through 2010 for various categories of projects that
reduce emissions of pollutants into the air.

A NO vote on this measure means: The State Air
Resources Board would not be directed to
establish a new tax credit program designed to
reduce emissions of pollutants into the air.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

American Lung Association, California Nurses
Association, and Sacramento Chamber of
Commerce support Proposition 7, the Air Quality
Improvement Act. Uses Private sector tax
incentives to reduce toxic emissions from buses
and trucks. Cleaner air benefits the health of
children and elderly. Creates no new bureaucracy.
Cuts no existing programs.

Proposition 7 is corporate welfare, pure and
simple. It gives tax breaks to the corporations
that paid to put it on the ballot. It guarantees
billions in taxpayers’ money to polluters, with
no accountability or regulation in return. It takes
money from universities, the environment and
law enforcement. Vote No.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1998g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).

PROP 42: Transportation Congestion Improvement Act. Allocation of Existing
Motor Vehicle Fuel Sales and Use Tax Revenues for Transportation Purposes
Only. Legislative Constitutional Amendment. 2002.
This measure places in the State Constitution those provisions of current law that require that,
from2003–04 through 2007–08, gasoline sales tax revenues be used for specified state and local
transportation purposes. The revenues would be allocated for transportation purposes specified under
the TCRP.
The revenues would be allocated as follows: 20 percent to public transportation. 40 percent to
transportation improvement projects funded in the State Transportation Improvement Program, a fiveyear transportation capital investment program. 40 percent to local streets and roads improvements; with
half of the amount (20 percent) allocated to counties and half to cities.
ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Proposition 42 is based on the principle that the
gasoline sales tax you pay when filling up your
tank ought to be used to improve our
transportation system. That’s exactly what Prop.
42 does. It requires the gasoline sales tax we’re
already paying be spent IMPROVING OUR
HIGHWAYS, LOCAL STREETS and MASS
TRANSIT—WITHOUT INCREASING OR
IMPOSING ANY NEW TAXES.

PROP 42 HAS US VOTING IN 2002 ON
SOMETHING THAT WILL NOT TAKE EFFECT
UNTIL 2008.Do you know what California’s
spending priorities should be in the year 2008 or
beyond? If you don’t, then you should VOTE No
on Prop 42.If Prop 42 passes and goes into
effect in 2008, it will force $1.2billion in cuts in
vital education, health care and public safety
services. Are you sure we should be locking
ourselves into that kind of spending priority
today?

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2002p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 51: Transportation. Distribution of Existing Motor Vehicle Sales and Use
Tax. Initiative Statute. 2002.
Redistributes portion of existing state motor vehicle sales/lease revenues from General Fund to Trust
Fund for transportation, environmental, and highway and school bus safety programs. Fiscal Impact:
Redirects specified General Fund revenues to transportation-related purposes, totaling about $420
million in 2002–03, $910 million in 2003–04, and increasing amounts annually thereafter, depending on
increases in motor vehicle sales and leasing.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: Thirty percent
of the General Fund revenues generated from the
sales tax on the lease and sale of motor vehicles
could be used only for state and local
transportation-related purposes, instead of
being available for programs funded by the
General Fund.

A NO vote on this measure means: These
revenues would continue to be available for
General Fund supported programs rather than
only for state and local transportation-related
purposes.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

YES on 51 dedicates EXISTING vehicle sales
taxes to repair unsafe roads and highways,
replace unsafe school buses, and make walk
paths to school safer for children. Includes tough
audit requirements. Endorsed by California Transit
Association, Lung Association, Nurses Association,
Safe Kids Network, firefighters, and Police Chief
Arturo Venegas.

In a time of continuing budget deficits,
Proposition 51 adds $1 billion to the deficit every
year for special interest projects. It gives your tax
dollars to campaign contributors, not California’s
priorities. Don’t force cuts in vital services or
require tax increases. Vote NO ON 51!

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2002g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 1A: Transportation Funding Protection. Legislative Constitutional
Amendment. 2006.
Protects transportation funding for traffic congestion relief projects, safety improvements, and local
streets and roads. Prohibits the state sales tax on motor vehicle fuels from being used for any purpose
other than transportation improvements. Authorizes loans of these funds only in the case of severe state
fiscal hardship. Requires loans of revenues from states sales tax on motor vehicle fuels to be fully
repaid within the three years. Restricts loans to no more than twice in any 10-year period. Fiscal Impact:
No revenue effect or cost effects. Increases stability of funding to transportation in 2007 and thereafter.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The State
Constitution would specify additional limitations on
the state’s ability to suspend the transfer of
gasoline sales tax revenues from the General
Fund to transportation. In addition, all past
suspensions would be required to be repaid by
June 30, 2016, at a specified minimum rate of
repayment each year.

A NO vote on this measure means: The State
Constitution would not further limit the state’s
ability to suspend the transfer of gasoline sales
tax revenues. State law, instead of the State
Constitution, would specify when past
suspensions would be repaid.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

YES on 1A dedicates taxes we already pay at the
pump for transportation improvements like
building roads, congestion relief, and safety
repairs. 1A closes a loophole in the law to
prevent politicians from spending gas taxes on
other programs. Rebuild California: YES on 1A—
safer roads, reduced congestion, www.ReadForYourself.org.

Vote “NO” on Proposition 1A! Keep Education,
health care, and disaster relief our State’s top
priorities. In hard economic times, “autopilot”
budgeting causes massive unnecessary cuts to
schools, firefighters, trauma centers, and health
care. The Governor and Legislature must have
flexibility to meet the needs of Californians. Vote
“NO” on Proposition 1A.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2006g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 1B: Highway Safety, Traffic Reduction, Air Quality, and Port Security Bond
Act of 2006.
This act makes safety improvements and repairs to state highways, upgrades freeways to reduce
congestion, repairs local streets and roads, upgrades highways along major transportation corridors,
improves seismic safety of local bridges, expands public transit, helps complete the state’s
network of car pool lanes, reduces air pollution, and improves anti-terrorism security at shipping ports
by providing for a bond issue not to exceed nineteen billion nine hundred twenty-five million dollars
($19,925,000,000). Fiscal Impact: State costs of approximately $38.9 billion over 30 years to repay
bonds. Additional unknown state and local operations and maintenance costs.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The state
could sell $19.9 billion in general obligation bonds,
for state and local transportation improvement
projects to relieve congestion, improve the
movement of goods, improve air quality, and
enhance the safety and security of the
transportation system.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state
could not sell $19.9 billion in general obligation
bonds, for these purposes.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

YES on 1B jump-starts traffic relief, mass transit,
and safety improvements in every corner of the
state without raising taxes.1B builds new roads
and transportation improvement projects that
enhance mobility and protect our economic future.
Rebuild California: YES on 1B—safer roads,
reduced congestion, and a strong economy,
www.ReadForYourself.org

California cannot afford to continue borrowing its
way into a false sense of economic
security. More borrowing means worsening
budget deficits. A no vote will force the
Legislature to focus on paying for our
transportation needs with existing funds in a
fiscally responsible manner. Please vote NO on
1B.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2006g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 87: Alternative Energy. Research, Production, Incentives. Tax on California
Oil Producers. Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute. 2006.
Establishes $4 billion program to reduce petroleum consumption through incentives for alternative
energy, education and training. Funded by tax on California oil producers. Fiscal Impact: State oil tax
revenues of $225 million to $485 million annually for alternative energy programs totaling $4 billion.
State and local revenue reductions up to low tens of millions of dollars annually.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The state
would impose a tax on oil production to support
$4 billion in expenditures to develop and promote
alternative energy technologies and promote the
reduction of petroleum use.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state
would not impose a tax on oil production to fund
these activities.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Vote YES on Prop. 87 and make oil companies
pay their fair share for cleaner, cheaper energy.
Oil companies pay billions in oil drilling fees in
Alaska and Texas—but almost nothing in
California. Prop. 87 makes oil companies pay and
makes it illegal to pass the cost to consumers.

$4 BILLION oil tax increase! HIGHER GAS
PRICES. HUGE BUREAUCRACY, LACKS
ACCOUNTABILITY. No requirement they
produce results. DENIES REVENUES to
SCHOOLS. We need alternative energy, but
Proposition 87 is not the way to get there. CA
Taxpayers’ Association, small business, labor,
schools, police, firefighters, farmers, Auto Club
say: Vote NO.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2006g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 91: Transportation Funds. Initiative Constitutional Amendment.
February 2008.
Prohibits certain motor vehicle fuel taxes from being retained in General Fund and delays repayment of
such taxes previously retained. Changes how and when General Fund borrowing of certain
transportation funds is allowed. Fiscal Impact: Increases stability of state funding for highways, streets,
and roads and may decrease stability of state funding for public transit. May reduce stability of certain
local funds for public transit.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The
state would no longer be able to suspend the
transfer of gasoline sales tax revenue from
the General Fund to transportation. In
addition, the state would be able to loan
specified transportation funds, potentially
including certain local transportation funds, to
the General Fund for essentially short-term
cash flow purposes only. The state, however,
may be able to loan to the General Fund,
without express time limitation for repayment,
certain state funds for public transit.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state would
still be able to suspend, under certain conditions,
the transfer of gasoline sales tax revenue from the
General Fund to transportation. Additionally, the state
would continue to be able, under certain conditions,
to loan specified transportation funds to the General
Fund for up to three fiscal years.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Prop. 91 is NO LONGER NEEDED. Please
VOTE NO. Voters passed Proposition 1A in
2006, accomplishing what Prop. 91 set out to
do. Prop. 1A stopped Sacramento politicians
from taking our gas tax dollars and using
those funds for non-transportation purposes.
Prop. 91 is no longer needed. VOTE NO.

No argument against Proposition 91 was submitted.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008p.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 1A: Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act. Legislative
Initiative Amendment. 2008.
To provide Californians a safe, convenient, affordable, and reliable alternative to driving and high gas
prices; to provide good-paying jobs and improve California’s economy while reducing air pollution, global
warming greenhouse gases, and our dependence on foreign oil, shall $9.95 billion in bonds be issued
to establish a clean, efficient high-speed train service linking Southern California, the Sacramento/San
Joaquin Valley, and the San Francisco Bay Area, with at least 90 percent of bond funds spent for
specific projects, with private and public matching funds required, including, but not limited to, federal
funds, funds from revenue bonds, and local funds, and all bond funds subject to independent audits?
Fiscal Impact: State costs of $19.4 billion, assuming 30 years to pay both principal and interest costs of
the bonds. Payments would average about $647 million per year. When constructed, unknown operation
and maintenance costs, probably over $1 billion annually; at least partially, and potentially fully, offset by
passenger fares.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The state
could sell $9.95 billion in general obligation bonds,
to plan and to partially fund the construction of a
high-speed train system in California, and to make
capital improvements to state and local rail
services.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state
could not sell $9.95 billion in general obligation
bonds for these purposes.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

California’s transportation system is broken:
skyrocketing gasoline prices and gridlocked
freeways and airports. High-speed trains are the
new transportation option that reduces greenhouse
gases and dependence on foreign oil. High-speed
trains are cheaper than building new highways and
airports to meet population growth and require NO
NEW TAXES.

Prop. 1A is a huge boondoggle. Taxpayers pay
at least $640,000,000 per year in costs for a
government run railroad. There’s no guarantee it
will ever get built. Expand existing
transportation systems instead to cut commutes
and save fuel. No on 1A: an open taxpayer
checkbook with virtually no accountability.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008gu.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 10: Alternative Fuel Vehicles and Renewable Energy. Bonds. Initiative
Statute. 2008.
Authorizes $5 billion in bonds paid from state’s General Fund, to help consumers and others purchase
certain vehicles, and to fund research in renewable energy and alternative fuel vehicles. Fiscal Impact:
State cost of about $10 billion over 30 years to repay bonds. Increased state and local revenues,
potentially totaling several tens of millions of dollars through 2019. Potential state administrative costs up
to about $10 million annually.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The state
could sell $5 billion in general obligation bonds for
various renewable energy, alternative fuel, energy
efficiency, and air emissions reduction purposes.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state
would not sell $5 billion in general obligation
bonds for these purposes.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

YES ON 10: ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND
CLEAN AIR. PRODUCES more electricity from
renewable sources, including solar and wind.
GIVES Californians rebates to purchase clean
alternative fuel vehicles. GETS polluting diesels off
roads. INCREASES grants to California
universities to develop cheaper alternatives to
gasoline. REQUIRES strict accountability/audits.
No new taxes.

Proposition 10 is special interest legislation
which gives away $10 billion in taxpayer dollars
to primarily benefit one company with little
accountability and NO guarantees of
environmental benefit. Don’t hurt our schools
and services in a time of budget crisis. Vote NO
on Prop. 10!

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).

PROP 22: Prohibits the State from borrowing or taking funds used for
transportation, redevelopment, or local government projects and services.
Initiative Constitutional Amendment. 2010.
Prohibits State, even during severe fiscal hardship, from delaying distribution of tax revenues for these
purposes. Fiscal Impact: Decreased state General Fund spending and/or increased state revenues,
probably in the range of $1 billion to several billions of dollars annually. Comparable increases in funding
for state and local transportation programs and local redevelopment.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: The state’s
authority to use or redirect state fuel tax and
local property tax revenues would be significantly
restricted.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state’s
current authority over state fuel tax and local
property tax revenues would not be affected.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

YES on 22 stops state politicians from taking local
government funds. 22 stops the State from taking
gas taxes voters have dedicated to transportation.
22 protects local services: 9-1-1 emergency
response, police, fire, libraries, transit, road
repairs. Supported by California Fire Chiefs
Association, California Police Chiefs Association,
California Library Association.

California’s teachers, firefighters, nurses, and
taxpayer advocates say NO on 22. If 22 passes,
public schools stand to lose billions of dollars.
22 takes money firefighters use to fight fires and
natural disasters while protecting redevelopment
agencies and their developer friends. Another
proposition that sounds good, but makes things
worse.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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PROP 23: Suspends implementation of air pollution control law (AB 32) requiring
major sources of emissions to report and reduce greenhouse gas emissions that
cause global warming, until unemployment drops to 5.5 percent or less for full
year. Initiative statute. 2010.
Fiscal Impact: Likely modest net increase in overall economic activity in the state from suspension of
greenhouse gases regulatory activity, resulting in a potentially significant net increase in state and local
revenues.
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
YES

NO

A YES vote on this measure means: Certain
existing and proposed regulations authorized
under state law (“Assembly Bill 32”) to address
global warming would be suspended. These
regulations would remain suspended until the state
unemployment rate drops to 5.5 percent or lower
for one year.

A NO vote on this measure means: The state
could continue to implement the measures
authorized under Assembly Bill 32 to address
global warming.

ARGUMENTS
PRO

CON

Yes on 23 saves jobs, prevents energy tax
increases, and helps families, while preserving
California’s clean air and water laws. California
can’t afford self-imposed energy costs that don’t
reduce global warming. 2.3 million Californians are
unemployed; Proposition 23 will save over a
million jobs that would otherwise be destroyed.
www.yeson23.com

Texas oil companies designed 23 to kill clean
energy and air pollution standards in California.
23 threatens public health with more air pollution,
increases dependence on costly oil, and kills
competition from job-creating California wind and
solar companies. American Lung Association in
California, California Professional Firefighters:
NO on 23.

Source: http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AB 32
ACES
ACS
CARB
CaHSRA
CBD
GHG
HSR
ICPSR
MPH
MSA
OLS
PPIC
Prop.
R2
SPUR
SWDB
ZCTA

Assembly Bill 32 (Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006)
American Clean Energy Act
American Community Survey
California Air Resources Board
California High-Speed Rail Authority
Central Business District
Greenhouse Gas
High-Speed Rail
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
Miles per Hour
Metropolitan Statistical Area
Ordinary Least Squares
Public Policy Institute of California
Proposition
R-squared (Coefficient of Determination)
San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association
Statewide Database (http://statewidedatabase.org)
Zip Code Tabulation Areas
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James P. and Matthew Dominguez. “The importance of modeling spatial spillovers
in public choice analysis.” Public Choice 150 (2012): 528. For details on the spivreg
function, see David M. Drukker, Prucha, Ingmar R. and Raciborski, Rafal. 2011. A
command for estimating spatial-autoregressive models with spatial-autoregressive
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disturbances and additional endogenous variables. The Stata Journal, Vol 1, Number
1: 1–13.
37. This quote comes from page 71 of the 1994 General Election Voter Information
Pamphlet. http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1994g.pdf (Accessed May
30, 2013).
38. Ibid., 69.
39. California Legislative Information (Official), “SB 1420 Senate Bill - CHAPTERED,”
[text of California Senate Bill SB 1420] http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/sen/
sb_1401-1450/sb_1420_bill_960924_chaptered.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
40. California High-Speed Rail Authority (CaHSRA), “California High-Speed Rail Program
Revised 2012 Business Plan,” (April 2012) http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12242 (Accessed March 10, 2013). This most
recent report was produced by KPMG. Earlier reports were produced by Charles River
Associates in 2001, Cambridge Systematics in 2008, and Parsons Brinkerhoff in 2011.
Comments by Rod Diridon, “California High-Speed Rail and Why It’s Important for
the Nation,” RITA - Monthly Webcasting Event for August 15, 2012, http://mediasite.
yorkcast.com/webcast/Viewer/?peid=7b7cc7961ffc4fa9bdbf47f6c530578f1d.
The
CaHSRA website contains several of these and related documents: http://www.
cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/Business_Plan_reports.aspx (Accessed February 15, 2012).
41. The source for this quote is the 2008 Official Voter Information Guide Supplement.
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2008gu.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
42. Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm, “The empirical relevance
of the new economic geography: Testing for a spatial wage structure in Germany,”
CESifo Working Paper Series No. 395, 2000, http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/
portal/docs/1/1190850.pdf (Accessed March 10, 2013).
43. Ibid.
44. If a voter visited the CaHSRA webpage before the election, he/she would have seen a
route map on cahighspeedrail.ca.gov that we reviewed (from 10/15/2008, http://web.
archive.org/web/20081015154427/http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/) This route
map is identical in terms of route and stations to our Figure 5. The 2008 map listed the
following stations names: San Francisco, SFO Airport, Redwood City/Palo Alto, San
Jose, Gilroy, Fresno, Visalia/Tulare/Hanford, Bakersfield, Palmdale, Sylmar, Burbank,
Los Angeles. This map also listed the following stations North of Fresno: Sacramento,
Stockton, Modesto, Merced, and the following stations south of Los Angeles: Norwalk,
Anaheim, Irvine, City of Industry, Ontario Airport, UC Riverside, Murrietta, Escondido,
University City, San Diego.
45. United States Census Bureau, “Labor Force Statistics,” http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/laborfor/acs_employ.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
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46. We considered and briefly experimented with an alternative coding method where
households beyond the fringe are dropped from the sample; the results did not appear
to differ substantially across the two methods.
47. Including only county fixed effects, the R2 is 0.4927. Including only BUSH (and no
county fixed effects), the R2 is 0.7364.
48. To determine HSR station locations, we used the CaHSRA website “Interactive Map”
page. The stations listed were the same as listed on the CaHSRA website on October
15, 2008, and those listed in our Figure 5, but the more recent website also supplied
maps of station locations, or at a minimum, the general neighborhood. The exception to
this is the station at Visalia/Tulare/Hanford; the most recent business plan, cited in note
15 above, confirms the general location of this station has still not been determined.
In our distance calculations, we did not include any location for the Visalia/Tulare/
Hanford station. For all the other stations, we clicked on the station map on the HSR
authority website, which as stated above returned a general neighborhood, and we
then determined the centroid of this neighborhood. We then calculated the distance
from each block group to each station location, and then found for each block group
the minimum distance to a HSR station. Interested parties may contact us for our list of
geocoded station locations. CaHSRA, “Interactive Map,” http://www.cahighspeedrail.
ca.gov/trip_planner.aspx (Accessed 11/11/2012).
49. Legislative bond initiatives like Prop 1A use general fund revenue to service bond
repayment. Thus, it is not clear how new bond obligations would impact any particular
homeowner. We admit, voters will not be sure about this either, but we believe they
will assume that to repay these bonds either their taxes will go up, or other services
provided by the state (e.g., highway patrol) will diminish. This is another way of saying
that we assume homeowners do not believe in free lunches. Also, as discussed
above, it is possible that the benefits of HSR are so large that it will generate net
benefits even for suburban households on the urban fringe. However, given that Prop
1A only garnered 52% of the vote, it at least appears that voters did not perceive such
massive benefits from the project.
50. The counties we include in the Central Valley subsample are Fresno, Kern, Kings,
Madera, Merced, San Benito, and Tulare. As of February 2013, the state legislature
had authorized bond sales, and construction appears set to begin in July of 2013,
(according to Vartabedian, 2013), though earlier claims by the CaHSRA, (CaHSRA
web page: “Starting in the Central Valley,” no publish date), scheduled construction to
begin in the second half of 2012. A recent event at San Jose State University featuring
the current CaHSRA Board Chairperson and other speakers provided a useful picture
of the current state of the project and areas of current contention. Eric Kurhi reported
on this event. Ralph Vartabedian, “California still hasn’t bought land for bullet train
route,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/
la-me-bullet-land-20130127,0,6688039.story (Accessed March 10, 2013); CaHSRA,
“Starting in the Central Valley,” (no publish date cited) http://www.cahighspeedrail.
ca.gov/centralvalleystart.aspx (Accessed March 10, 2013); Eric Kurhi, “Bullet train
chief, critic have dueling views at San Jose forum,” San Jose Mercury News, November
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29,
2012,
http://www.mercurynews.com/california-high-speed-rail/ci_22095957/
bullet-train-chief-opponent-have-dueling-views-at (Accessed March 10, 2013).
51. To conserve space we do not include a separate table of summary statistics for
the Central Valley subsample. There are differences and similarities between this
subsample and the statewide sample. Support for Prop. 1A was basically the same
in both, as measured by the fraction supporting Prop. 1A, though support was slightly
lower in the Central Valley. This is despite the fact that the average of BUSH was 0.55
in the Central Valley (compared to 0.41 for the state as a whole). Other noticeable
differences between summary statistics are that the value of COLLEGE is half of the
state-level average in the Central Valley, where there are also more lower-income
households.
52. Michael Hanemann, “How California Came to Pass AB 32, the Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006,” http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1vb0j4d6 (Accessed March 10,
2013).
53. Ibid., 3.
54. Estimates of GHG emission trends in California are supplied by CARB in the
“Trends in California Greenhouse Gas Emissions for 2000 to 2009” on the California
Environmental Protection Agency website. According to this document, “California’s
gross emissions of greenhouse gas decreased 1.5% between 2000 and 2009” (p. 1).
For more information on AB 32 and associated regulations and market mechanisms,
see “Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act,” also on that website.
California Environmental Protection Agency, “Trends in California Greenhouse Gas
Emissions for 2000 to 2009,” http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/ghg_
inventory_00-09_trends.pdf (Accessed March 10, 2013); California Environmental
Protection Agency, “Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act.” http://www.arb.
ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (Accessed March 10, 2013).
55. This is from page 6 of the 2010 general election Official Voter Information Guide,
http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (Accessed May 30, 2013).
56. This is perhaps the best recent example of how California is a policy trendsetter.
For more information, see the Sierra Club (November 2012) article. In this case, the
first light duty vehicle GHG emission standard actually preceded AB 32, but CARB
has continued to implement this and other regulations with identical policy goals.
Sierra Club California, “Light Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards,”
(November 13, 2012) http://sierraclubcalifornia.org/campaigns/drive-green-california/
light-duty-vehicle-greenhouse-gas-emissions-standards (Accessed March 10, 2013).
57. Information on these and other regulations can be found at California Environmental
Protection Agency, “Fact Sheets / FAQs,” http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/facts/facts.htm
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
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58. Ian W.H. Parry and Kenneth A. Small, “Should Urban Transit Subsidies Be Reduced?,”
The American Economic Review 99 (2009): 700-724.
59. Christopher R. Knittel, “Reducing Petroleum Consumption from Transportation,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 26 (2012): 93-118.
60. Though not as refined as our measure of these variables calculated using census
block group centroids in the voting data.
61. We also estimate equation (2) using each of the five questions as dependent variables,
and these results can be found in Appendix B to this report.
62. Given the relatively small sample size, a comparison of the adjusted R2 is preferred;
here we see the value is 0.11 in column 1, and 0.22 in column 2. This means ideology
by itself explains twice as much of the variation in support from Prop. 23 as do socioeconomic and demographic variables by themselves.
63. Technically, because we have included county fixed-effects, this would be true for a
Republican in Alameda County, which is the county for which we have excluded the
county fixed effect. To prevent the statistical problem of prefect multicollinearity, one
county fixed effect must be exclucded from each regression. In the models presented
here and every fixed-effect model in this report we choose to exclude Alameda, simply
because it is the first county when counties are listed in alphabetical order.
64. These results hold up to heteroskedastic-robust standard errors, both with and without
county fixed effects.
65. The natural log of 80 (the maximum distance to downtown assigned to a block group)
is 4.4 (technically, ln(80)=4.38).
66. Note that lnDISTANCE ranges from 0 to 4.4., and so when we find that dPCT_23_Y/
dHOMEOWN = ((0.0141 × lnDISTANCE) - 0.0410), it is quite a large effect.
67. Both tables present full results of the unrestricted model, unlike Table 12 and Table
14 that, to conserve space, do not report estimates for all socio-economic and
demographic variables.
68. See Gerber et al. (2001) who discusses the effect of this proposition passing on transit
infrastructure. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and D.
Roderick Kiewiet, Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct
Democracy (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001).
69. California Voter Foundation, “#181 Passenger Rail And Clean Air Bond Act of 1994,”
http://www.calvoter.org/archive/94general/props/181.html (Accessed March 10,
2013).
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70. The results we report here for Prop. 181 are very similar to those from an identical
analysis of Prop. 156 (from 1992), which we do not report.
71. We do not include a table of variable descriptions as we did for the previous case
studies, as the variables are coded in nearly identical ways. For example, the income
categories are coded as fraction of the block group with income between zero and
25,000, between 25,000 and 50,000, and so on. All other variables definitions are as
above, although we did not obtain unemployment data for this analysis.
72. Future work could analyze data from all of these surveys; combining the surveys
would have the advantage of multiplying the number of observations and lowering the
standard errors of the estimates.
73. We do not have voting data for Prop. 42 because when we accessed the SWDB it did
not provide data for this proposition in the same format as for the other 15 propositions
for which we analyze voting data.
74. For the 2002 file, we first matched each county to a 1994 MSA, and then used 2000
ZCTA Gazetteer files to determine population, land area, and geocode. Note the area
used is reported in square miles, and land area does not account for development
potential, water areas, or other factors. United States Census Bureau, “U.S. Gazetteer:
2010, 2000, and 1990,” http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer.html
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
75. In addition to the 2010 PPIC survey, we were able to analyze two other surveys
with zip code identifiers and questions resembling transit propositions in preparation
of writing this report. A Field Poll survey, the fourth conducted in 1994, contained
questions about attitudes towards gas taxes and towards green taxes and fees (such
as higher registration fees for low mileage vehicles), and seemed to us to reflect likely
opinions on Prop. 185 from the same year. We analyzed these data and are willing
to share our preliminary results with interested researchers, but we decided not to
pursue analyzing these data in the present research project as the survey questions
were not as tightly related to Prop. 185, as for example how the questions in the PPIC
survey were clearly related to Prop. 23. Thus, we wanted to preserve this report’s
focus on ballot propositions, rather than shift the focus to attitudes towards green
taxes and fees. Understanding attitudes towards environmentally friendly forms of
taxation is an important area for future research. In addition to preliminary analysis of
the 1994 Field Poll data, we took one additional step towards assessing the general
area of determinates of support for green taxes and fees by analyzing the survey
data collected by Dill, Agrawal and Nixon (2009) on attitudes among Californians in
2008. In this analysis we found results consistent with the broad findings in this report
concerning urban form; living farther from the center reduces support for green taxes.
These results are more preliminary than the rest we report (i.e., the data we analyzed
are more likely to contain coding errors or specification errors.) Despite this, it may
be worthwhile to report here that, regarding the results of analysis of the 1994 Field
Poll survey data on attitudes towards green taxes and fees, the results, interestingly,
showed the same unexpected sign on lnDENSITY that we find in analysis of Prop.
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185 using voting data. We return to this point when discussing Prop. 185, towards the
end of this report.

76. Though, as suggested above, Prop. 111 had costs that were focused on those who
drive more, it also had benefits that were focused on those who drive more, and
so this, perhaps, would not have been the ideal proposition with which to test our
hypotheses, as our hypotheses are relevant for propositions where the net benefits
vary spatially.
77. Although we have little basis for this prediction, it would be interesting to investigate
whether Prop. 125 failed in part because it was decided in the November election (and
November elections have higher turnout), whereas Props. 108, 111 and 116 passed
because they took place in the March election.
78. Prop. 157 had to do with the management of toll roads. We did not find any compelling
theoretical reasons why urban form, ideology, or our other variables would be strongly
related to support for this proposition.
79. The following quote alludes to both the (special interest) controversy we mention in
the text, as well as another idiosyncrasy regarding the 1994 election, namely a surge
in fiscal conservative sentiment: “Voters were not in the mood to spend anything.
Despite the efforts of the Planning and Conservation League, which sponsored
Proposition 185, and Southern Pacific Railroad, which supported it financially up until
the last few weeks of the campaign, voters were not convinced that a high-speed
railway between Los Angeles and San Francisco would be worth an extra 4 percent
tax on gasoline. It was defeated resoundingly, which was no surprise since it had
been lagging in the polls for weeks. In fact, in mid-October, the chairman of Southern
Pacific issued a letter stating that the company was aware of the measure’s sinking
popularity and would no longer be giving money to the campaign. They had already
given nearly $500,000 and stood to reap more than $600 million if it had passed.
Opponents accused the Planning and Conservation League of tailoring the measure
to suit a special interest. Although PCL denied the charge, the damage was already
done. Even without special-interest rumors, it is doubtful that the measure would have
passed; the last thing anyone wanted to propose in 1994 was a tax increase.” Kirsten
Mangold, “Propostions 181 and 185,” California Journal (December 1994): 20-24.
http://www.unz.org/Pub/CalJournal-1994dec-00020a02?View=PDF&apages=0022
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
80. The positive coefficient on lnDENSITY for Prop. 1A (from 2006) is, however, inconsistent
with the hypothesis of spatially varying net benefits, and we encounter similar findings
above with Props. 7 and 185.
81. See Appendix C for the source of this quote.
82. The recent book by urban economist Edward Glaeser (2011) makes many of these
same recommendations. Edward L. Glaeser, Triumph of the City (New York: Penguin
Press, 2011).
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83. Egon Terplan and Heng Gao, “Getting High-Speed Rail On Track.” The Urbanist 515
(2012),
http://www.spur.org/publications/library/article/getting-high-speed-rail-track
(Accessed March 10, 2013).
84. We would caution policy makers that the cap and trade money may not be as high
as expected. It may be found that after businesses start paying for GHG emissions,
to remain profitable, their overall tax burden will need to be reduced closer to its precap-and-trade levels, in which case, permit sales revenue may be needed to bolster
the general fund. We strongly support a tax system that includes carbon pricing, but
for California’s GHG mitigation legislation to be successful, it is critical to keep a focus
on the economy, at least if by successful one means that other states will follow the
lead of California.
85. U.S. Census Bureau, “TIGER/Line® Shapefiles and TIGER/Line® Files,” http://www.
census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-line.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
86. The 1990 and 2000 Shapefiles for census block groups were obtained from ESRI,
“ArcData,” http://arcdata.esri.com/data/tiger2000/tiger_download.cfm (Accessed
March 10, 2013).
87. U.S. Census Bureau, “Census Block Relationship Files,” http://www.census.gov/geo/
www/relate/rel_blk.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
88. The 2010 Shapefiles for census block groups were obtained from the Census, U.S.
Census Bureau, “2010 Census TIGER/Line® Shapefiles,” http://www.census.gov/
geo/www/tiger/tgrshp2010/tgrshp2010.html (Accessed March 10, 2013).
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